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Abstract
In this dissertation, we study the interplay between a firm’s operations strategy,
with regard to its capacity management, and its marketing decision of product dif-
ferentiation. For this, we study a market comprising heterogeneous customers who
differ in their preferences for time and price. Time sensitive customers are willing
to pay a price premium for a shorter delivery time, while price sensitive customers
are willing to accept a longer delivery time in return for a lower price. Firms exploit
this heterogeneity in customers’ preferences, and offer a menu of products/services
that differ only in their guaranteed delivery times and prices. From demand per-
spective, when customers are allowed to self-select according to their preferences,
different products act as substitutes, affecting each other’s demand. Customized
product for each segment, on the other hand, results in independent demand for
each product. On the supply side, a firm may either share the same processing
capacity to serve the two market segments, or may dedicate capacity for each seg-
ment. Our objective is to understand the interaction between product substitution
and the firm’s operations strategy (dedicated versus shared capacity), and how they
shape the optimal product differentiation strategy.
To address the above issue, we first study this problem for a single monopolist
firm, which offers two versions of the same basic product: (i) regular product at
a lower price but with a longer delivery time, and (ii) express product at a higher
price but with a shorter delivery time. Demand for each product arrives according
to a Poisson process with a rate that depends both on its price and delivery time.
In addition, if the products are substitutable, each product’s demand is also influ-
enced by the price and delivery time of the other product. Demands within each
category are served on a first-come-first-serve basis. However, customers for express
product are always given priority over the other category when they are served us-
ing shared resources. There is a standard delivery time for the regular product,
and the firm’s objective is to appropriately price the two products and select the
express delivery time so as to maximize its profit rate. The firm simultaneously
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needs to decide its installed processing capacity so as to meet its promised delivery
times with a high degree of reliability. While the problem in a dedicated capac-
ity setting is solved analytically, the same becomes very challenging in a shared
capacity setting, especially in the absence of an analytical characterization of the
delivery time distribution of regular customers in a priority queue. We develop a
solution algorithm, using matrix geometric method in a cutting plane framework,
to solve the problem numerically in a shared capacity setting.
Our study shows that in a highly capacitated system, if the firm decides to
move from a dedicated to a shared capacity setting, it will need to offer more dif-
ferentiated products, whether the products are substitutable or not. In contrast,
when customers are allowed to self-select, such that independent products become
substitutable, a more homogeneous pricing scheme results. However, the effect of
substitution on optimal delivery time differentiation depends on the firm’s capac-
ity strategy and cost, as well as market characteristics. The optimal response to
any change in capacity cost also depends on the firm’s operations strategy. In a
dedicated capacity scenario, the optimal response to an increase in capacity cost is
always to offer more homogeneous prices and delivery times. In a shared capacity
setting, it is again optimal to quote more homogeneous delivery times, but increase
or decrease the price differentiation depending on whether the status-quo capacity
cost is high or low, respectively. We demonstrate that the above results are cor-
roborated by real-life practices, and provide a number of managerial implications
in terms of dealing with issues like volatile fuel prices.
We further extend our study to a competitive setting with two firms, each of
which may either share its processing capacities for the two products, or may dedi-
cate capacity for each product. The demand faced by each firm for a given product
now also depends on the price and delivery time quoted for the same product by
the other firm. We observe that the qualitative results of a monopolistic setting
also extend to a competitive setting. Specifically, in a highly capacitated system,
the equilibrium prices and delivery times are such that they result in more differ-
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entiated products when both the firms use shared capacities as compared to the
scenario when both the firms use dedicated capacities. When the competing firms
are asymmetric, they exploit their distinctive characteristics to differentiate their
products. Further, the effects of these asymmetries also depend on the capacity
strategy used by the competing firms. Our numerical results suggest that the firm
with expensive capacity always offers more homogeneous delivery times. However,
its decision on how to differentiate its prices depends on the capacity setting of the
two firms as well as the actual level of their capacity costs. On the other hand, the
firm with a larger market base always offers more differentiated prices as well as
delivery times, irrespective of the capacity setting of the competing firms.
v
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Increasing market competition has forced modern businesses to introduce new prod-
ucts and ever greater variety at rapid rates, and speed has evolved as the competi-
tive paradigm (Blackburn 1991, Hum and Sim 1996). As speed became a driver of
business success, lead time reduction emerged as a dominant issue in manufacturing
strategy (Van Beek and Van Putten 1987, Suri 1998, Hopp and Spearman 2000).
In fact, the ability to offer customized products with short lead times is becoming
a competitive advantage among suppliers (Andel 2002). This new shift in firms’ fo-
cus is termed as time-based competition. Time-based competition mandates speed
in every aspect of the business. Firms today compete primarily on three com-
ponents of time: product development time, manufacturing lead time, customer
response/delivery time (Kim and Tang 1997). Product development time is the
time a firm needs to transform an idea into a product. Manufacturing lead time is
the time to convert raw materials to finished goods. Response time is the time it
takes to fulfill a customer’s order. Competing in time gives a firm the advantage
of increased market share, increased price premium, and reduced cost (Stalk and
Hout 1990). Shorter product development time gives a firm an early entry into the
market, enabling it to establish itself as a market leader. Shorter manufacturing
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lead time allows a manufacturer to provide the same level of customer service even
with reduced finished goods and work-in-process inventories, which in turn helps
mitigate the risk of obsolescence and cut inventory costs. Shorter response time
increases customer satisfaction, which further helps repeat business.
In this thesis we focus on service and Make-to-Order (MTO) manufacturing
industries where firms commonly use shorter response time as a competitive prior-
ity. As firms are moving from Make-to-Stock (MTS) to Make-to-Order (MTO) to
reduce costs and increase market responsiveness, quoting effective prices and reli-
able lead times becomes especially important (Martin 2000, Vinas 2006). In service
industries, customers regard total service time as a key concern (Stevenson 1999).
The importance of a shorter response/delivery time has been highlighted in liter-
ature by several stories of their successful implementation. Progressive Insurance,
an automobile insurance company based in Ohio, achieved a sevenfold growth of
sales from $1.3 billion in 1991 to $9.5 billion in 2002 as a result of introducing an
Immediate Response claims system, which dramatically reduced the claim handling
time from 7-8 days to just nine hours (Hammer 2004). Shell Lubricants redesigned
its order fulfillment process, thus reducing the cycle time by 75% and operating
expenses by 45%, and boosting customer satisfaction 105% (Hammer 2004). Ray
(2001) reports the case of an Electronics Manufacturing Service (EMS) company
in Toronto, which specializes in supplying electronic components for a number of
international Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). The OEMs were ready
to pay for many of the lead time reduction initiatives undertaken by the EMS since
it helped them reduce the delivery time to their customers. Atlas Door, a leading
supplier of customized industrial overhead doors in the United States, is able to
fill an order for a door within four weeks, one third the industry average. Respon-
siveness has earned Atlas Door a large customer base, which is often willing to pay
the premium price for quick delivery. Atlas is growing three times faster than the
industry, and is five times more profitable than the industry average (Stalk and
Hout 1990). Thomasville Furniture markets its quick-ship program, under which a
customer order delivered within 30 days against the competitors’ average response
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time of more than three months. Thomasville is growing four times faster than the
industry, and the company is twice as profitable as the U.S. industry average (Stalk
and Hout 1990). Other successful stories can be found in Charney (1991), Stalk
and Hout (1990) and Blackburn (1991).
There are three basic response/delivery time based strategies that firms use
to attract customers: (i) to serve customers as fast as possible, (ii) to encourage
potential customers to get a delivery time quote before placing orders, and (ii) to
guarantee a uniform delivery time to all potential customers (Ray and Jewkes 2004,
So and Song 1998). The second strategy of encouraging customers to get a delivery
time quote is more popular in make-to-order manufacturing industry where firms
dynamically change the quoted delivery time based on the congestion in the system
(Plambeck 2000). Our focus in this thesis is on the strategy of offering a uniform
delivery time guarantee, which is also popular in make-to-order industries but has
been more popularized by retail and service industries as it eliminates the uncer-
tainty in receiving the service. Many firms today use their uniform delivery time
guarantee in their promotion campaigns. For example, Cat Logistics, a subsidiary
of Caterpillar, promises to ship service parts within 24 hours to its clients (Schmidt
and Aschkenase 2004). Ameristock quotes maximum 10 seconds per internet eq-
uity trade (Boyaci and Ray 2003, Zhao et al. 2008). Tradewinds Coffee waives
its shipping charges if the product is not delivered on time (Ho and Zheng 2004).
Domino’s Pizza advertises its 30 minutes delivery guarantee (Charney 1991). In
freight services, Federal Express offers next day mail delivery by 11:00 a.m. (So
and Song, 1998).
1.2 Market Segmentation and Product Differen-
tiation
Shorter delivery time guarantee can have a major impact on both demand as well
as price. Sterling and Lambert (1989), Blackburn et al. (1992), Maltz and Maltz
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(1998) and Smith et al. (2000), besides others, have empirically shown the impact
of delivery time on customer demand. In Industrial markets, a 5% increase in
delivery time can lead to a loss of 24% of the demand from the existing customer
base (Ballou 1998). The importance of speed or shorter lead times has also provided
firms with new business opportunities. Firms try to exploit customers’ sensitivity
to speed/time to extract price premium for the same product by promising them
a shorter delivery time. Amazon.com, for example, charges more than double the
shipping costs to guarantee a delivery in two days against its normal delivery time
of around a week (Ray and Jewkes, 2004). Amazon.com thus tries to serve both
the market segments - one that is price sensitive and is willing to wait for a week
for its delivery, and the other that is more time sensitive and is willing to pay a
premium price for a faster delivery. Firms, like Amazon.com, that differentiate
their products based on delivery times try to exploit heterogeneity in customers’
preference for time and willingness to pay in order to create market segments that
maximize the firm’s revenue (Boyaci and Ray 2003).
Heterogeneity in customers’ willingness to pay for delivery time guarantees may
be inherent in their personalities. Some customers may be price sensitive and may
not mind waiting to be served if that can reduce the price they need to pay. Others
may be more impatient and thus willing to pay a price premium if that will shorten
their waiting time. Heterogeneity may also be caused by situational factors. For
example, whether or not a customer is willing to pay a premium may depend on the
urgency of her need. Ultimately, a customer’s choice from a menu of delivery times
offered will depend on her perception of the price difference relative to the difference
in the delivery times offered. If a particular customer feels the extra price she needs
to pay is worth the improved service she is offered in return, she is likely to select
an express delivery option; otherwise she will select a slower delivery. The services
offered are thus often substitutable, and customers’ decisions can be influenced by
designing a menu that carefully discriminates between the services offered using
differential pricing and delivery times. Market segmentation together with product
differentiation can thus provide firms with a unique business opportunity to make
4
greater revenues by influencing some customers to opt for express delivery at a
higher price. For example, Plantgel, a firm selling nutrition gels for plants online,
offers to process an order within a day for an extra $3, against a regular delivery
of 10 days (Zhao et al. 2008). FedEx offers logistic services like “FedEx Next
Flight”, “FedEx First Overnight”, “FedEx Priority Overnight” and “FedEx 2Day”,
each with a different price and delivery time guarantee to target different customer
segments having different sensitivities to price and delivery time. Similarly, UPS
offers “UPS Express Early A.M.”, “UPS Express”, “UPS Express Saver” and “UPS
Expedited” for different categories of customers.
1.3 Product Differentiation and Operations Strat-
egy
A firm’s marketing decisions are often closely linked to its operations strategies.
Different firms in an industry compete with each other by offering better deals,
either in the form of a lower price, better service or both to their customers. In
a make-to-stock industry, a higher service level (a faster delivery) translates into
a better inventory management, whereas in a make-to-order or service industries,
this usually translates into a better (server) capacity/queue management. One
question that naturally arises in a firm’s pursuit of market segmentation and prod-
uct differentiation in a make-to-order or service industry is whether to pool or to
differentiate the facilities used for each market segment. Examples from industry
suggest the use of both, each having its own merits. FedEx, for example, uses
separate facilities for its express and ground services. In the words of Frederick
W. Smith, chairman, president and CEO of FedEx, “the optimal way to serve
very distinct market segments, such as express and ground is to operate highly
efficient, independent networks with different facilities, different cut-off times and
different delivery commitments1”. In contrast, UPS delivers express and ground
1http://www.fedex.com/us/about/express/pressreleases/pressrelease011900.html?link=4
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services using one integrated network. According to UPS,“it is their integrated air
and ground network that enhances pickup and delivery density and provides them
with the flexibility to transport packages using the most efficient and cost-effective
transportation mode or combination of modes2”.
Boyaci and Ray (2003) present other cases from industry that use dedicated ca-
pacities. For example, web hosting and content delivery firms maintain dedicated
servers for customers like news sites whose content for online delivery is time sen-
sitive. This makes possible real time update to their data. Other customers whose
data do not require frequent updates are served using a different set of servers.
Boyaci and Ray (2003) cite another example of a Southeast Asia based printing
company, which uses separate facilities for time sensitive magazines like the Asian
editions of Time, Neewsweek, etc., and separate facilities for books printed in mass
scale. Further, the company uses a dedicated delivery system for time sensitive
materials.
In contrast to the above examples, photo development stores offering one-hour
express service and a cheaper three-day regular service share their capacities for
the two different services. A mobile telephony service provider shares its facilities
with other service providers to provide roaming services to their customers. The
service provider in this case normally charges a higher price for roaming services
compared to the basic service provided to its own customers. Similarly, a third
party logistics service provider shares its fleet of vehicles to serve multiple firms
with different delivery time guarantees (Sinha et al. 2008). Another interesting
example provided by Sinha et al. (2008) is the possible sharing of rail-linked inland
container depots (ICDs), required for inland rail container movement in India,
which was until recently solely managed by Container Corporation of India Ltd.
(Concor). Due to the recent opening up of inland rail container movement to private
players, new firms may seek to lease these ICDs from Concor in the initial years
due to their high infrastructural set up cost.
2http://sec.edgar-online.com/1999/10/20/11/0000940180-99-001230/Section2.asp
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In the academic literature, authors advocate the use of dedicated channels when
different customer segments have very different needs (Fuller et al. 1993, Farris
2002, Smith et al. 2000). In the transportation and logistics industry, for exam-
ple, with a recent dramatic rise in “time-definite” premium transportation services,
many carriers now maintain two totally separate capacities (trucks and informa-
tion systems), one dedicated to time sensitive premium shipments and another
dedicated to normal cost-effective shipments (Farris 2002). Whitt (1999) techni-
cally justifies this by arguing that when customer classes have different service time
distributions, serving them using a common capacity increases the overall coeffi-
cient of variation of the service times, resulting in service quality for time sensitive
customers being degraded by customers with longer service times. Thus there is a
natural motivation for separate express checkout lines in supermarkets. However,
if different classes of customers have the same service time distribution, it is known
that shared capacity is more efficient as it exploits the benefits of pooling (Whitt
1999). In a call center, capacities (equipment and employees) are generally shared
between normal and priority calls, with time sensitive priority customers served on
a priority basis. Similarly, while boarding an aircraft, the same server generally
serves economy as well as business/priority customers, although business class cus-
tomers are prioritized. Offering different delivery time guarantees using a shared
capacity (SC), however, creates supply-side interaction and requires mechanism for
prioritizing orders. This creates operational complexities and potentially increas-
ing costs. Providing different services using dedicated capacities (DC), on the other
hand, requires additional capacity investment (Zhao et al. 2008).
1.4 Research Agenda and Organization of the The-
sis
From the above discussion, we see that time has emerged as a key competitive
priority in today’s business, which is highlighted by several stories of successful
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implementation of time-based strategies. Firms that traditionally competed only
based on costs have gradually shifted their focus to time. This shift in focus has
come from a realization that customers do not only value money but also time,
often to an extent that they are willing to pay a premium to get a faster service.
Consequently, the last decade has witnessed vast literature on time-based compe-
tition. So and Song (1998), Palaka et al. (1998), Ray and Jewkes (2004), Hill and
Khosla (1992), Tsay and Agarwal (2000), So (2000), Allon and Federgruen (2007),
to name a few, have studied the problem of pricing and delivery time decisions for
make-to-order/service industries in a time sensitive market. In this thesis, we aim
to build upon some of the existing works to further contribute to this literature
by identifying research avenues that are still unexplored. As discussed above, we
find that often heterogeneity exists in customers’ sensitivity to time (and their will-
ingness to pay), which firms try to exploit by offering the same basic product or
service with different delivery time guarantees and at different prices. However, we
observe that different firms doing this may use very different operations strategies.
For example, some firms use a dedicated set of resources for each market segment,
while others pool their resources to serve the different market segments. This leads
to the basic research question: how does the operations strategy, specifically capac-
ity strategy, of a firm affect its pricing and delivery time differentiation strategy in
a time sensitive market. This is the central issue we try to investigate in this thesis.
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we define our
research problem in detail, and develop a basic modelling framework of a firm’s
pricing and delivery time decisions in a monopolistic setting. The mathematical
models and the solution methods developed in Chapter 2 allow us to compare the
price and delivery time differentiation strategies of a firm under dedicated and
shared capacity settings. We study this problem extensively in chapter 3 to derive
important managerial insights. In Chapter 4, we further extend our modelling
framework to a competitive setting. We address the same research question to
investigate if and how market competition affects our results. The competitive
models developed in Chapter 4 are studied extensively in Chapter 5. Finally, we
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summarize our work and provide directions for future research in Chapter 6. We
differ slightly from the usual convention in our presentation of this thesis in that
we do not have a separate chapter for literature review. We instead dedicate a
separate section on literature review in each of the Chapters 2 and 4. This allows
us to position our work better with respect to the literature on monopolistic and
competitive settings, which are reviewed separately in these two chapters.
1.5 Research Contribution
• We extend the existing literature on product differentiation in a segmented
market by developing a modelling framework in a shared capacity setting. To
the best of our knowledge, it is the first attempt to study product differen-
tiations in a shared capacity framework. This allows us to study the effects
of a firm’s capacity strategy (dedicated versus shared) on its price and de-
livery time differentiation strategies. It also allows us to study the effect of
substitution between different market segments on the product differentiation
strategies, and how it interacts with the capacity strategy of a firm in shaping
its optimal differentiation decisions.
• We further extend our modelling framework to study price and delivery time
decisions in a competitive setting. This allows us to investigate if, and how,
the capacity strategy of firms affect their product differentiation strategies
in presence of market competition. This also allows us to better understand
the effects of competition, per se, on price discrimination, given that research
thus far has produced very contradictory results.
• Our study makes a significant technical contribution to the study of price and
delivery time decisions by presenting a novel solution method, which links
matrix geometric method to a cutting plane algorithm, to solve a complex
mathematical model for the shared capacity setting.
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• Our study provides several important insights of special interest to operations
managers.
Some of the important managerial insights we generate from our study can be
summarized as:
• A firm’s capacity cost plays a major role in determining the relative product
differentiation in the two capacity settings. Whereas the relative sensitivities
of customers to price and time determines the effect of product substitution
on product differentiation.
• In a high capacity cost environment, a firm with shared capacity should of-
fer products with greater differentiation (both in terms of prices and delivery
times) than a firm with dedicated capacities, irrespective of whether the prod-
ucts are substitutable or not.
• When a firm selling two non-substitutable products in independent markets
decides to make both products available to all customers (thus introduc-
ing substitutability), it should reduce its price differentiation, irrespective
of whether it operates under shared or dedicated capacity regime. However,
as regards delivery times, whether the products should be more differentiated
or more homogeneous depends on the firm’s capacity strategy (as well as on
its marginal capacity cost and market characteristics).
• The optimal response to any change in the capacity cost depends on the ca-
pacity strategy as well as the existing level of capacity cost. As the capacity
cost increases, the optimal strategy for a firm with dedicated capacities is to
offer a more homogeneous pricing and delivery time scheme for both substi-
tutable and non-substitutable products. A shared capacity firm should also
always offer more homogeneous delivery times, but needs to increase or de-
crease the price differentiation, depending on whether the status-quo capacity
cost is high or low, respectively.
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• Pure price competition decreases individual prices as well as price differen-
tiation. Whereas when firms use delivery times, in addition to prices, as a
strategic variable to compete, the effect of competition on product differenti-
ation depends on customer behavior.
The second insight above has major implications for FedEx and UPS who use ded-
icated and shared capacity strategy, respectively. We show that the differentiation
policies adopted by these firms indeed support our results. The third insight is
important for firms thinking about modifying the customer access to their product
offerings. The fourth insight is relevant in view of volatile fuel prices, which trans-
lates into fluctuations in capacity costs, and how firms like FedEx and UPS should
change their product differentiation in order to adapt to this new reality.
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Chapter 2
Monopolistic Market: Models &
Solutions
2.1 Introduction
Progressive Insurance, an automobile insurance company based in Ohio, achieved a
sevenfold growth of sales from $1.3 billion in 1991 to $9.5 billion in 2002 as a result
of introducing an Immediate Response claims system, which dramatically reduced
the claim handling time from 7-8 days to just nine hours (Hammer 2004). Shell
Lubricants redesigned its order fulfillment process, thus reducing the cycle time
by 75% and operating expenses by 45%, and boosting customer satisfaction 105%
(Hammer 2004). The above examples highlight the importance of response/delivery
time, in addition to pricing policy, to a firm’s success. Firms, especially in service
and make-to-order manufacturing sectors, are increasingly using explicit delivery
time guarantees as a marketing strategy (Hammer 2004, Liu et al. 2007, Zhao
et al. 2008). One form of delivery time guarantee, commonly used in retail and
service industries, is to announce the delivery time in advance to all prospective
customers1. For example, Cat Logistics, a subsidiary of Caterpillar, promises to
1Another form of time guarantee, popular in make-to-order manufacturing industry, is to
dynamically change the quoted delivery time based on congestion in the system when a demand
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ship service parts within 24 hours to its clients (Schmidt and Aschkenase 2004).
Such guarantees are also used by firms like Ameristock, FedEx, UPS and Domino’s
Pizza (Zhao et al. 2008, Boyaci and Ray 2003).
Keeping the above discussion in mind, we study a setting where the end cus-
tomer demand is sensitive to both the price charged and the delivery time guarantee
offered. In that case, a firm needs to address two basic issues. The first is related
to marketing, and involves determining whether to offer the same product to all
its customers (i.e., guarantee the same delivery time at the same price for all), or
to offer price-and-delivery-time differentiated products (different delivery times at
different prices). Offering the same product/service with different different delivery
time guarantees at different prices is popular when customers are heterogenous in
their sensitivity to price and time. For example, Plantgel, a firm selling nutrition
gels for plants online, offers to process an order within a day for extra $3, against
a regular delivery of 10 days (Zhao et al. 2008). FedEx offers logistic services like
“FedEx Next Flight”, “FedEx First Overnight”, “FedEx Priority Overnight” and
“FedEx 2Day”, each with a different price and delivery time guarantee to target
different customer segments having different sensitivities to price and delivery time.
Similarly, UPS offers “UPS Express Early A.M.”, “UPS Express”, “UPS Express
Saver” and “UPS Expedited” for different categories of customers. Obviously, man-
agers also need to decide on the optimal prices and delivery times for whichever
policy they choose. A firm’s marketing decision cannot be decoupled from its op-
erations strategy in a capacitated environment. So, if a firm decides to guarantee
different delivery times to its different customer segments, the second choice to
be made is whether to dedicate separate capacities for each market segment or to
pool/share the capacities used for all segments, and what will be the corresponding
optimal capacity level.
We study firms offering a menu of differentiated products/services to exploit
heterogeneity in customers’ preference for time and willingness to pay. Such firms
arrives (Plambeck 2004).
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then need to deal with the issue of whether a given product be accessible to all
customers, or need to be customized (and available) for only one segment. For
example, the price and delivery time combinations that Dell quotes to government
and health-care companies are very different from what they quote to individuals
(MacWilliams 2001). In this case, Dell designs a specific service for each mar-
ket segment, which is not available to the other. Dell’s options are, therefore,
non-substitutable, and the demand for each segment is independent of the other.
Similarly, in the steel, chemical and consumer product industries, the price and
delivery time quoted to a customer is tailored based on its geographical location
and industry segment (Plambeck 2004 and references therein). On the other hand,
FedEx and UPS offer logistic services like “FedEx First Overnight”, “FedEx 2Day”,
“UPS Express”, “UPS Express Saver”, etc., each with a different guaranteed de-
livery time, to every customer willing to pay the corresponding price. In this case,
customers self-select the (delivery time) option based on their preference for speed
and willingness to pay. This allows them to switch their preferences, depending on
the relative values of prices/delivery times for the products and/or their situational
needs. For example, a customer that is otherwise price sensitive may opt for a
faster delivery (and more expensive) option in case of an emergency. The menu of
products offered are thus substitutable, creating a demand-side interaction between
the different market segments.
Like the demand side, the supply side for different customer segments may also
be independent or related to each other depending on the operations (capacity)
strategy used by the firm. By operations (specifically capacity) strategy, we mean
whether there are dedicated capacities (DC) for each customer segment or there
is one shared capacity (SC) for all segments. Both strategies are used in practice.
FedEx, for example, uses separate facilities for its express and ground services. In
contrast, UPS delivers express and ground services using one integrated network.
Photo development stores offering express and regular services also share capacity
used for the two services. Note that offering different delivery time guarantees using
a shared capacity creates a supply-side relationship between the different market
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segments a firm serves, and thus requires mechanisms for prioritizing orders. This
creates operational complexities, potentially increasing costs. Providing different
services using dedicated capacities implies that there is no such interaction, but
requires additional capacity investment (Zhao et al. 2008).
Our primary objective in this thesis is to understand the interaction between
(demand-side) product substitution and (supply-side) operations strategy in a ca-
pacitated environment, and how it affects a firm’s optimal product differentiation
policy. Specifically, we study the following issues.
• How does the operations strategy (dedicated or shared capacity) of a firm
affect its optimal price and delivery time decisions for the two products,
and hence its product differentiation policy? Are these effects impacted by
whether there is a demand-side interaction or not (i.e., whether the products
are substitutable or non-substitutable)?
• How does the substitutability between the products a firm offers shape its
optimal differentiation decisions, and are these effects influenced by the firm’s
capacity strategy?
• How does the optimal product differentiation strategy of a firm change with
increase in capacity cost under different demand and supply conditions?
In order to answer the above questions, we analyze and compare the four scenarios
shown in Table 2.1. Comparison of the two scenarios under the dedicated and
shared capacity columns demonstrates the effect of product substitution under two
different capacity regimes. On the other hand, comparison of the two scenarios in
the “without substitution” and “with substitution” rows shows the effect of the
capacity strategy, depending on whether the products are substitutable or not.
Note that, although our focus is on comparing different scenarios, our work also
distinguishes itself by analyzing the problem of optimal product differentiation in
a shared capacity setting, which has not been studied much in the literature (there
are some studies in this setting but with very different objectives).
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Table 2.1: Different scenarios
Dedicated capacity ↓ Shared capacity ↓
Without Non-substitutable products; Non-substitutable products;
substitution → dedicated capacity shared capacity
With Substitutable products; Substitutable products;
substitution → dedicated capacity shared capacity
We first derive the optimal delivery times that the firm should guarantee and
the optimal prices it should charge for the two products (consequently, the opti-
mal level of product differentiation) as well as the optimal capacity level it should
have/build2 for each scenario. Note that while the dedicated capacity cases can
be solved by functional optimization, for the shared capacity scenarios we utilize
a novel methodology involving the matrix-geometric, the cutting plane and the
golden section search methods.
Comparison of the results of the four scenarios for various levels of capacity cost
enables us to illustrate the individual and joint effects of product substitution and
operations strategy on the optimal product differentiation policy of the firm. The
rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In §2.2, we briefly review the related
literature. §2.3 defines the modelling framework, followed by a discussion on the
solution methodology in §2.4. Analysis of results to draw important managerial
insights is deferred to chapter 3.
2.2 Related Literature
The literature related to our study can be categorized into four groups, based on
whether they consider demand-side and/or supply side interaction (like in Table
2.1).
2To satisfy the promised delivery times with a certain degree of reliability.
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The papers in the first category study a single product, and hence product dif-
ferentiation or substitutability is not an issue. These papers can thus be categorized
as those that deal with “non-substitutable products; dedicated capacity” scenario.
These include So and Song (1998), Palaka et al. (1998) and Ray and Jewkes (2004).
All these papers study optimal pricing, delivery time and capacity decisions, while
modelling the firm’s operations as a single server queue. So and Song (1998) use
an M/M/1 queueing model for a firm serving a stream of demands with a mean
that has log-linear (Cobb-Douglas) relationship with the price charged and the de-
livery time guaranteed. They propose a mathematical framework to understand
the interrelations among the pricing, delivery time and capacity decisions. They
characterize the optimal decisions, and use numerical results to provide managerial
insights into the effects of a firm’s different operating characteristics on its optimal
strategy.
Palaka et al. (1998) use a similar framework but with a linear relationship
between the mean demand, price and the delivery time. They also take into account
the work-in-process and lateness penalty costs. Ray and Jewkes (2004) further
extend this line of work by explicitly modelling price as a function of delivery time,
besides demand being a function of price and delivery time. Hill and Khosla (1992)
also study a similar tradeoff between price and delivery time but in a deterministic
framework.
Besides these, So (2000), Tsay and Agarwal (2000), Allon and Federgruen (2007)
and Pekgun et al. (2006) also study similar problems but they are in a competitive
setting, where two firms selling a common product compete on price and delivery
time. Again, their models do not study product differentiation. We review these,
and other papers using a competitive framework, in chapter 4.
The second category of papers takes into account product differentiation and
substitution among multiple products, and assume that the products are processed
using dedicated capacities. Boyaci and Ray (2003, 2006) are examples of such
“substitutable products; dedicated capacity” scenario papers. Boyaci and Ray
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(2003) study a firm selling the same product to two customer classes with different
delivery time guarantees and at different prices. The firm uses dedicated facilities,
each of which is modelled as an M/M/1 queueing system, to serve the two customer
classes. The mean demand from each customer class is modelled as a linear function
of its own price and delivery time as well as price and delivery time quoted to the
other class. They develop a mathematical model that jointly determines the prices,
delivery times and the capacity decisions, and study scenarios where the firm is
constrained in capacity for none, one or both the customer classes.
Boyaci and Ray (2006) further extend this work to model the dependence of
demand rates on delivery reliability guarantees (with which customers are served
within their promised delivery times), in addition to prices and delivery times. Zhao
et al. (2008) also use a similar modelling framework, but focus on comparing two
different delivery time strategies - providing one uniform guaranteed delivery time
(and charging one price) for all customers versus providing different guaranteed
delivery times (and charging different prices) for different customer segments. Fur-
ther, rather than explicitly modelling the demand rates for the two customer classes,
they use an optimization model for the customers’ product selection problem.
There is another stream of literature that models scenarios where capacities are
shared for serving different customer segments. For example, Dewan and Mendel-
son (1990), Mendelson and Whang (1990), Stidham (1992), Afeche (2004), Afeche
and Mendelson (2004) and Katta and Sethuraman (2005) study pricing and/or ca-
pacity selection issues for heterogeneous customers in a queuing context, wherein
all customers are served by the same service facility. Since they do not deal with
substitution issue, these papers fall under the “non-substitutable products; shared
capacity” category. In general, the problem considered in these papers, except
Afeche (2004), is to design an incentive compatible pricing and scheduling policy
that maximizes the expected net value of the jobs processed by the system. In
contrast, our model has the firm’s profit maximization as its objective. Moreover,
these models employ user delay costs, which is fundamentally different from our
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approach of using a delivery time guarantee. In further contrast, we do not ex-
plicitly model the customers’ utility/value functions but assume that the demand
function is an outcome of some underlying process whereby customers select the
service class that maximizes their utility3.
The work that is closest to ours in this category is by Sinha et al. (2008). They
consider an operational setting in which a resource/server, which already serves an
existing class (called primary class) of customers, is shared with a new class (called
secondary class) of customers. The resource owner uses a delay dependent priority
discipline (see Kleinrock 1964, Kanet 1982) to serve the two classes of customers.
The problem is to determine the optimal price and the guaranteed delivery time
(called quality of service) to the secondary customers, and the optimal parameter
that specifies the relative delay dependent priority of one class of customers over
the other. They use a linear demand function for the secondary class customers,
which depends on its own price and delivery time, but is independent of the price
and delivery time already being offered to the existing customers. In this sense,
the services offered to the two customer classes are non-substitutable. They also
assume that the resource owner has already entered into a long term agreement
with the primary customers, and hence the price and delivery time offered to them
are assumed as fixed. In contrast, we consider prices of both the classes as decision
variables. Further, they consider service levels based on average delivery times of
served customers, which is very different from our definition of service level based
on probability distribution of the delivery times of served customers. This does
not provide any bound on instances of unusually long delivery times. It is quite
possible then that a large portion of the demands are actually not served within their
promised delivery times, even if the promised delivery times are met on average.
We, therefore, assume that firms select their capacity levels so as to fulfill their
promised delivery times with a high level of reliability (generally 99%). This makes
the delivery time guarantees more attractive, although it makes the problem a lot
3Liu et al. (2007) shows the equivalence between a utility function and the corresponding
demand model.
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more challenging to solve. In further contrast, they assume the installed capacity
as fixed, whereas we assume that it is possible to alter the processing capacity in
the short term by, for example, adding a shift or installing additional equipment.
Lastly, Ata and Van Mieghem (2008) study the conditions under which het-
erogeneous customers should be served by dedicated resources or by an integrated
network through partial pooling of resources. In their setting, customer segments
are served by capacities dedicated for each, but capacities can also be dynamically
substituted. Their main goal is to understand the value of network integration.
We can place this paper in the “substitutable products; shared capacity” cell since
they consider resource substitution. However, note that they do not deal with
product substitution or pricing/delivery time decisions, and so do not capture the
interaction between product substitution and capacity strategy.
Our work also fits in the stream of price discrimination, extensively studied in
the Economics (Industrial Organization) literature. The case of “without substitu-
tion” corresponds to third-degree price discrimination wherein different customers
are quoted different prices based on their distinctive characteristics. Whereas
the case of “with substitution” corresponds to second-degree price discrimination
wherein customers are allowed to self-select from a given menu of options. More
discussion on price discrimination can be found in Talluri and Van Ryzin (2004).
Our study complements the existing literature on pricing and delivery time de-
cisions by delineating the individual and joint effects of supply and demand side
interactions in a capacitated environment. This allows us to generate new man-
agerial insights regarding how the optimal product differentiation strategy for firms
should vary depending on their operations strategy, product offering portfolio, mar-




We model a Make-to-Order (MTO) or a service firm, and hence delivery time is a
key element to customer service. The firm offers a single product/service (hence-
forth called product) in a market comprising heterogenous customers that differ in
their preferences for speed and willingness to pay. The firm exploits this hetero-
geneity in customers’ preferences to create market segments in which customers are
quoted a menu of different delivery times and corresponding prices for (otherwise)
the same product. For simplicity, we assume the market is segmented into two cus-
tomer classes, indexed by k ∈ {h, l}. Class h customers are high priority/express
customers who are more time sensitive and are willing to pay a price premium
for a shorter delivery time. Class l customers are low priority/regular customers
who are more price sensitive and are willing to accept a longer delivery time for a
price discount. pk and Lk denote the price and delivery time offered by the firm to
customer class k ∈ {h, l}.
Demand from customer class k arrives according to a Poisson process with rate
λk(pk, Lk, k ∈ {h, l}), which depends not only on its own absolute price and deliv-
ery time but also on its price and delivery time quoted relative to the other class.
The firm can, therefore, attract new customers through price reductions and/or by
offering shorter delivery times. Lowering the price and/or delivery time for one
class can also induce customers to switch preferences. We assume that customers
cannot observe the congestion levels of the firms, and their choices are only based
on the prices and delivery times announced by the firms. The demand rates are
modelled using the following linear functions, inspired by Tsay and Agrawal (2000)
and Boyaci and Ray (2003):
λh = a− βhp ph + θp(pl − ph)− βhLLh + θL(Ll − Lh) (2.1)
λl = a− βlppl + θp(ph − pl)− βlLLl + θL(Lh − Ll) (2.2)
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where,
2a : market base
βkp : sensitivity of class k demand to its own price
βkL : sensitivity of class k demand to its own guaranteed delivery time
θp : sensitivity of demand to inter-class price difference
θL : sensitivity of demand to inter-class delivery time difference
2a parameterizes the total market base. Mathematically, it is the total demand
when price and delivery time offered to each customer class is zero. It captures the
aggregate effect of all the factors other than price and delivery time on demand. For
logistics service providers like FedEx and UPS, for example, these other factors may
include factors like the convenience of pick-up, the ease with which deliveries can
be tracked and the likelihood of the packages being damaged. For internet service
providers, these may include factors like the frequency of service interruptions and
the quality of the support staff (Allon and Federgruen 2008). Our demand model
generalizes the one used by Tsay and Agrawal (2000) and Boyaci and Ray (2003) by
using different sensitivities (to price and time) for regular and express customers.
We feel it is necessary to use different sensitivities for the two customer classes as
this is essentially what differentiates express customers from regular ones. However,
the sensitivities of demand switchovers (θp and θL) are still the same across the two
classes, as is required to make the total market size invariant to changes in these
sensitivities. Our demand model differs from Pekgun et al. (2006) for similar
reasons. We make the following assumptions regarding the market parameters:
Assumption 2.1. βkp > 0, β
k
L > 0, θp ≥ 0, θL ≥ 0, βhp < βlp and βhL > βlL.
This is to ensure that demand from a market segment is decreasing in its own price
and delivery time, and is increasing in price and delivery time offered to the other






L are required by definition of the two customer
classes.
Assumption 2.2. The market base a is sufficiently large.
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This assumption is required, as we will see in §2.4, to ensure that the optimal
prices and demands are non-negative and that the optimal delivery time offered to
time sensitive express customers is smaller than what is offered to price sensitive
customers, i.e., Lh < Ll.
The exact behavior of the market depends on the specific combination of market
parameter values. One extreme case is when θp = θL = 0, which models the
“without substitution” scenario. In a “with substitution” scenario, two cases of
special interest, as we see in chapter 3, are described as:
• Time Difference Sensitive (TDS): We say the market is TDS type when the
relative sensitivity of customers to the difference in delivery times (with re-
spect to their own delivery time) is greater than their relative sensitivity to the





k ∈ {h, l}.
• Price Difference Sensitive (PDS): We say the market is PDS type when the
relative sensitivity of customers to the price difference (with respect to their
own price) is greater than their relative sensitivity to the difference in delivery





k ∈ {h, l}.
The choice of a linear demand function arises partly from its simplicity, which
makes the model tractable, and allows us to obtain qualitative insights without
much analytical complexity. Besides, it also possesses some desirable properties
that are not exhibited even by the more popular Cobb-Douglas function (Palaka
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a− βkppk + θp(pj − pk)− βkLLk + θL(Lj − Lk)
, k, j ∈ {h, l}, j 6= k
Clearly, the price elasticity of demand (Epk) for a given segment k is increasing in
its own delivery time Lk. Similarly, the delivery time elasticity of demand (ELk) for
a given segment k is increasing in its own price pk. These properties are desirable
since we expect customers to be more sensitive to their price when they have longer
waiting times, and more sensitive to their delivery time when they are paying a
higher price.
We assume the time it takes to serve a demand from class k is exponentially dis-
tributed with rate µk, k ∈ {h, l}. The service facility is thus modelled as an M/M/·
queuing system. M/M/· queuing model is a traditional abstraction employed to
make the problem tractable, especially when the emphasis is more on manage-
rial insights than on accuracy (Palaka et al. 1998). Moreover, Lariviere and Van
Mieghem (2004) have shown that self interested customers try to spread themselves
out as much as possible and the arrival pattern this generates approaches a Pois-
son process as the number of customers and arrival points gets large. We further
assume customers within each class are served on a first-come-first-serve (FCFS)
basis. The firm can invest in its installed capacity to increase its processing rate
µk. Since the pricing and delivery time decisions are generally short-term operating
decisions, the capacity decision we consider here typically refers to expanding short
term capacity in the existing facilities such as adding a shift or installing an addi-
tional equipment, rather than some long-term strategic decisions such as building
new service facilities. We assume there is no economies of scale in investing in ca-
pacity. So a unit increment in µk per unit time always costs $A. A may be different
for different customer classes if they are served by different service capacities (e.g.,
express customers served by airplanes and regular customers served by trucks in a
service logistics industry) or they may be equal if both the classes are served by the
same service capacity. Using the same marginal capacity cost for the two customer
classes, however, allows a meaningful comparison between the dedicated and the
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shared capacity settings. We also assume that the firm incurs the same operating
cost of $m in serving a customer of either class.
The industry is assumed to have established a standard delivery time Ll for
regular customers. The objective of the firm is to set the guaranteed delivery
time Lh for express customers and the prices ph and pl for both classes, so as to
maximize its profit per unit time. Obviously, a firm’s pricing and delivery time
decisions depend crucially on its capacity decision. Firms may charge premium
prices by committing to shorter delivery times. This, however, puts pressure on the
firm’s available resources to reliably meet its promised delivery times. Failure to
meet the guarantee may lead to penalties, either in the form of a discount, partial
refund or an expedited delivery without additional charge to the customer (Liu et al.
2007). FedEx, for example, offers a money-back guarantee for every U.S. shipment
that is even 1 minute late compared to its guaranteed delivery time 4. Similarly,
Black Angus Restaurants offer their customers free lunches if not served within 10
minutes (Charney 1991). A striking example is the case of seven online retailers,
including Macys.com, Toysrus.com and CDNOW, that paid fines to the tune of $1.5
million to settle a Federal Trade Commission lawsuit over late deliveries made in
1999 (Pekgun 2007). The firm, therefore, needs to simultaneously select the optimal
service rates (i.e., capacities) µh and µl in order to meet the guaranteed delivery
times with at least a minimum level of reliability α (called the target service level).
The target service level α is set by the management as an internal performance
measure, which is not quoted to the customers. Thus, we do not explicitly consider
its impact on the mean demand in our demand model (2.1) and (2.2). However,
since failure to honor its promised delivery time often leads to penalties for the
firm, α is set to a high value, close to 1. This means that the chances of a customer
of class k having to wait longer than Lk are very small. A schematic representation
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Figure 2.1: Schematic representation of a monopolistic model
Notation
k : index for customer class; k ∈ {h, l}
λk : mean demand rate from customer class k (units/unit time)
µk : mean processing rate for customer class k (units/unit time)
pk : price charged to customer class k ($/unit)
Lk : delivery time quoted to customer class k (time units)
Wk : steady state actual sojourn (waiting + service) time of customer class
k (time units)
α : target service level (no unit)
Sk(Lk) : actual service level achieved for quoted delivery time Lk, i.e., P(Wk ≤
Lk) (no unit)
m : unit operating cost ($/unit)
A : marginal capacity cost ($/unit)
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2.3.2 Mathematical Model
The firm’s problem of determining the optimal prices, delivery times and processing




π = (ph −m)λh + (pl −m)λl − A(µh + µl) (2.3)
subject to:
Lh < Ll (2.4)
ph, pl, λh, λl, µh, µl, Lh ≥ 0 (2.5)
Stability condition (2.6)
Sh(Lh) = P (Wh ≤ Lh) ≥ α (2.7)
Sl(Ll) = P (Wl ≤ Ll) ≥ α (2.8)
where λh and λl are given by (2.1) and (2.1) respectively. Constraint (2.4) requires
that the guaranteed delivery time for high priority customers be shorter than that
for the other class. Constraint set (2.5) is needed to define a realistic problem
setting. Constraint (2.6) is the stability condition for the queuing system, which
models the service facility at the firm. Later, we will see that, irrespective of the ca-
pacity setting, this condition is automatically satisfied by the remaining constraints,
and hence excluding this constraint leaves the feasible region of the problem un-
changed. Constraints (2.7) and (2.8) are delivery time reliability constraints (also
called service level constraints), which say that the steady state actual delivery time
Wh (resp., Wl) of a customer should not exceed the guaranteed delivery time Lh
(resp., Ll) with a probability of at least α. We call the above mathematical model
a Pricing and Delivery Time Decision Problem (PDTDP).
A special case of PDTDP is where the delivery times are fixed such that the
prices and capacities are the only decisions made by the firm. This is relevant to
situations where a firm may face a significantly higher stickiness for their delivery
time decisions compared to their ability to vary prices (Allon and Federgruen 2007).
27
A relatively higher stickiness for delivery time decisions may arise, for example,
when the services are partly outsourced to a third party. For example, a logistics
firm like FedEx may maintain its own fleet of airplanes for international or inter-
state deliveries but beyond that it may outsource its delivery services to a third
party logistics service provider. In such a situation, its delivery times are dictated
partly by its service level agreement with the third partly logistics service provider.
Any change in its delivery time guarantee to its own customers thus requires a
renegotiation of its service level agreements with the third party logistics service
provider. In such a situation, the firm may not be able to revise its delivery time
decisions as frequently as it can revise its prices.
Higher stickiness in delivery time decisions may also arise because of human
resource practices or labor contracts that prohibit frequent changes to installed
capacity via changes to workforce. Or it may arise due to long lead times for tech-
nology purchases (Allon and Federgruen 2007). In such a case, a firm may fix a
part of its capacity investment, which varies with its guaranteed service level, by
maintaining a fixed delivery time standard over a longer horizon. For example, air-
line call centers are designed to handle 80% of the economy class passengers within
20 seconds. Airlines have stuck for years to the same waiting time standard, while
willing to change prices daily (Allon and Federgruen 2007). A significantly high
stickiness in delivery time decisions may prevent a firm from frequently adjusting
its delivery times in response to any change in market parameters (β’s and θ’s) or in
its operating parameters (m, A). Under such situations, a firm optimizes its prices,
treating its delivery times as fixed. We call this special case a Pricing Decision
Problem (PDP).
Note that the above model ((2.1) - (2.8)) is a general one that is applicable
to all the scenarios in Table 1. In what follows, we develop the exact framework
for each of the four scenarios by specifying: i) the form of constraints (2.6)-(2.8)
depending on the capacity strategy used (shared or dedicated), and ii) the form of
the demand function that signifies absence or presence of product substitution.
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Dedicated Capacity Setting
For a dedicated capacity setting, where each customer class is served by a separate
M/M/1 server, the sojourn time distribution for either class of customers is known
to be exponential. In this case, there is a separate stability condition for each of
the queues. Hence, constraints (2.6), (2.7) and (2.8) can be expressed as:
λk − µk < 0, k ∈ {h, l} (2.6DC)
Sh(Lh) = P (Wh ≤ Lh) = 1− e(λh−µh)Lh ≥ α (2.7DC)
Sl(Ll) = P (Wl ≤ Ll) = 1− e(λl−µl)Ll ≥ α (2.8DC)
The two demand scenarios, substitutable and non-substitutable products, can be
obtained with θp > 0, θL > 0 and θp = θL = 0, respectively, in (2.1) and (2.2). We
denote the resulting models of Pricing and Delivery Time Decision Problem in a
Dedicated Capacity setting by PDTDPDC .
As noted above, although we have explicitly included (2.6DC) in PDTDPDC to
ensure stability of the system, this is implicitly satisfied by the delivery time reli-
ability constraints (2.7DC) and (2.8DC)). This is clear from the following alternate




+ λk, k ∈ {h, l}
For a practical problem, Ll is finite, and Lh is also finite since Lh < Ll for any
feasible solution. For a finite Lk,
ln(1−α)
Lk
< 0 since α < 1. This implies that any
solution that satisfies (2.7DC) and (2.8DC) will automatically satisfy the stability
condition: µk > λk, k ∈ {h, l}.
Shared Capacity Setting
The firm’s choice of shared capacity is modelled using a single server, which serves
both customer classes employing a simple fixed priority scheme that always gives
priority to time-sensitive customers. In other words, the firm reserves its capacity
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to serve high priority customers who pay a premium price, and uses the remaining
capacity to serve low priority customers. This somewhat reflects the practice at
UPS (Ata and Van Mieghem 2008). Dedicated capacities with partial pooling more
accurately model the operational setting used by UPS where fast airplanes can serve
both express and regular markets, while the slow trucks can serve only the regular
market. We use shared capacity (with complete pooling) to study the extreme
scenario and compare it with the dedicated capacity setting, typical of FedEx. The
fixed priority scheme is also used by Plambeck (2004) where premium customers
are given priority in scheduling. Customers within each class are served on a first-
come-first-served (FCFS) basis. In this paper, we use a preemptive priority scheme,
but the analysis can easily be extended to a non-preemptive priority discipline.
For a shared capacity setting, the sojourn time distribution Sh(·) for high pri-
ority customers in a preemptive priority queue is known to be exponential (So
2000). Hence, the delivery time reliability constraint (2.7) has the same analytical
representation as that for the dedicated capacity setting. However, a closed form
expression for the sojourn time distribution Sl(·) for low priority customers, appear-
ing in equation (2.8) of PDTDP, is not known (Abate and Whitt 1997). We assume
the single server serves customers of either class at the same rate µh = µl = µ, which
is a decision variable. Constraints (2.6) and (2.7) in a shared capacity setting can
then be expressed as:
λh + λl − µ < 0 (2.6SC)
Sh(Lh) = P (Wh ≤ Lh) = 1− e(λh−µ)Lh ≥ α (2.7SC)
We discuss how we tackle the issue of delivery reliability for regular customers
(corresponding to Equation (2.8)) in the next section. Like before, the substitutable
and non-substitutable demand cases can be obtained with θp > 0, θL > 0 and
θp = θL = 0, respectively, in (2.1) and (2.2). We denote the resulting models
of Pricing and Delivery Time Decision Problem in a Shared Capacity setting by
PDTDPSC (including Sl(Ll) constraint).
We now show that any solution that satisfies the two delivery time reliability
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constraints of PDTDPSC will automatically satisfy the stability condition (2.6
SC).
We first note that the delivery time reliability constraint for express customers
has the same form in both the dedicated and shared capacity settings. Therefore,
as shown for dedicated case, any feasible solution will always satisfy: λh < µ.
However, if λh < µ but λh + λl → µ, then the queue of regular customers will grow
infinitely long such that the probability of serving a regular customer within a
finite time will approach 0. Thus, the delivery time reliability constraint for regular
customers can never be satisfied. Therefore, any solution that satisfies the two
delivery time reliability constraints of PDTDPSC will always satisfy the stability
condition: λh + λl < µ.
We summarize the above mathematical models in the following table, which
corresponds to the four scenarios described in Table 2.1.
Table 2.2: Mathematical Models for the different scenarios as special cases of
PDTDP
Dedicated capacity ↓ Shared capacity ↓
Without PDTDPDC with PDTDPSC with
substitution → θp = θL = 0 θp = θL = 0
With PDTDPDC with PDTDPSC with
substitution → θp > 0, θL > 0 θp > 0, θL > 0
2.4 Solution Methodology
We now discuss the solution methodology for the models discussed in §2.3. The
four different mathematical models for the corresponding scenarios described in
§2.1 (Table 2.1) are shown in Table 2.2. We essentially have two different mathe-
matical models: PDTDPDC and PDTDPSC , corresponding to dedicated capacity
and shared capacity settings. The corresponding mathematical models for “without
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substitution” and “with substitution” scenarios in each of the two capacity settings
are obtained simply by substituting θp = 0, θL = 0 and θp > 0, θL > 0, respectively.
We now discuss the solution to PDTDPDC and PDTDPSC .
2.4.1 Dedicated Capacity Setting
We first state some propositions, which are used to arrive at the final results.
Proposition 2.1. In a dedicated capacity setting, both the delivery time reliability
constraints (2.7DC) and (2.8DC) in PDTDPDC are binding at optimality.




+ λk k ∈ {l, h}
The profit function π is decreasing in µk. Therefore, to maximize profit, the two
service rates should be at their minimum levels that guarantee the desired service
level α. This implies that at optimality, the two delivery time reliability constraints




+ λk, k ∈ {h, l}
Proposition 2.1 suggests that it is optimal for firms to stick to their minimum
delivery time reliability (α) since a better service level to customers comes at an
extra cost to the firm. As a result of Proposition 2.1, PDTDPDC reduces to maxi-
mizing (2.3) with µi as given above. Note that the stability conditions (2.6
DC) are
automatically satisfied by the above equation. This allows us to reduce PDTDPDC
















ph, pl, λh, λl, Lh ≥ 0
Proposition 2.2. For a fixed Lh, the objective function (2.9) of PDTDP
′
DC is
strictly concave in ph and pl.
Proof. The Hessian for (2.9), for a fixed Lh, is given by:
 −2(βhp + θp) 2θp
2θp −2(βlp + θp)

Clearly, the first order leading principal minor of the Hessian is negative, while its
determinant is positive. This proves that the objective function (2.9) in PDTDP
′
DC
is strictly concave for a fixed Lh.
Proposition 2.2 suggests that, for a fixed Lh, PDTDP
′
DC has a unique maxi-
mum, which can be obtained using functional optimization of its objective function
(2.9), as long as ph, pl, λh and λl are non-negative and Lh < Ll. We ensure that
these constraints are satisfied at optimality by imposing restrictions on our model
parameter values.
Proposition 2.3. For a fixed express delivery time Lh, the optimal prices in a





(βlp + 2θp)a− (βlpβhL + βlpθL + βhLθp)Lh + (βlpθL − βlLθp)Ll






(βhp + 2θp)a + (β
h
p θL − βhLθp)Lh − (βhp βlL + βhp θL + βlLθp)Ll
2(βhp βlp + βhp θp + βlpθp)
(2.11)
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Proof. pDC∗h (Lh) and p
DC∗








Since (2.9), for a fixed Lh, is strictly concave in ph and pl, solving the above system
of equations gives a unique pair of prices that maximizes π(Lh).
The corresponding optimal price differentiation is then:
pDC∗h (Lh)− pDC∗l (Lh) =
(βlp − βhp )a + βhp βlLLl − βlpβhLLh + (βhp + βlp)θL(Ll − Lh)
2(βhp βlp + βhp θp + βlpθp)
(2.12)
Example 2.1: Assume the parameter values as shown in Table 2.3. The optimal
prices obtained using Proposition 2.3, and other related variables, for Lh = 0.50
are shown in Table 2.4.







L θL a m A α Ll
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10.7585 8.7797 13.2353 7.9052 4.0250 3.3000 39.7305
Proposition 2.4. The optimal express delivery time LDC∗h in a dedicated capacity













− A ln(1− α)
L2h
(2.13)
where, pDC∗h (Lh) and p
DC∗
l (Lh) are given by (2.10) and (2.11).
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Proof. Substituting the optimal prices, given by Proposition 2.3, into the objective




















=− 6A ln(1− α)
L4h
(2.15)
Let us understand the nature of the profit function π(Lh) as we vary Lh. Since
Lh ∈ [0, Ll), we are interested in its behavior only for non-negative values of Lh.
Property 2.1. As Lh → 0+, π(Lh) → −∞.
This is obvious from the expression for π(Lh) in (2.9).
Property 2.2. π(Lh) is increasing concave in Lh in the vicinity of Lh = 0
+.
This can be easily verified by noting that as Lh → 0+, (2.13) → +∞ and (2.14)
→ −∞.
Property 2.3. As Lh increases from 0, π(Lh) changes from concave to convex for
some Lh ∈ (0, +∞), and never becomes concave again.
Since (2.15) is always positive for Lh ∈ [0, +∞)⇒ (2.14) is monotonically increasing
in [0, +∞). This implies that as Lh increases from 0, (2.14) changes sign from
negative to positive, and hence π(Lh) changes from concave to convex, for some
Lh ∈ (0, +∞), and never changes to concave again. Using properties 2.1, 2.2 and
2.3, the nature of π(Lh) in [0, +∞) can be summarized as shown as in Figure 2.2.
It is clear from the behavior of π(Lh), as shown in Figure 2.2, that it has a unique
maximum and at most one minimum in [0, +∞). The stationary points are given





< 0 is sufficient to guarantee that (2.13) has a unique root in
the interval [0, Ll), and that it is the point of maximum. The condition simplifies to:
−
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Figure 2.2: Behavior of the profit function for Lh ∈ [0, +∞)
Since βhp < β
l
p (Assumption 2.1), a necessary condition for (2.16) to hold is a to
be high (Assumption 2.2). A sufficiently high value of a also guarantees pk > 0,
ph > pl and λk > 0.
Proposition 2.4 gives the optimal express delivery time LDC∗h in a dedicated
setting. LDC∗h does not have a closed-form analytical solution. However, it can be
obtained numerically using a simple bisection method (Burden and Faires 2000)
since π(Lh) is unimodal in [0, Ll) (see proof of Proposition 2.4). The optimal prices
can be obtained using Proposition 2.3 by substituting Lh = L
DC∗
h . If θp > 0, θL > 0
in the above equations then we have the solution for the “substitutable products;
dedicated capacity” case, while θp = θL = 0 in the above equations will generate
the solution for the “non-substitutable products; dedicated capacity” scenario.
Example 2.2: Assume the parameter values as shown in Table 2.3. The optimal
decisions, obtained using Proposition 2.4, demand and profit are shown in Table
2.5.
The above example suggests that if the firm had flexibility in selecting its express
delivery time as well then Lh = 0.5 in Exampe 2.1 was not optimal. The firm should,
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0.5562 10.7032 8.7830 12.2653 7.9192 3.9857 3.3141 39.7753
in fact, increase its delivery time offered to express customers from 0.5 to 0.5562,
and at the same time decrease its express price from 10.7585 to 10.7032 and increase
its regular price from 8.7797 to 8.7830. This increases its profit from 39.7305 to
39.7753.
Example 2.3: Table 2.6 shows the optimal price, delivery time and capacity de-
cisions, obtained using Proposition 2.4, for the parameter combinations shown in
Table 2.3 and for various combinations of substitution parameters and capacity
cost.
Table 2.6: Results for Example 2.3
Without substitution With substitution
(θp = θL = 0) (θp = 0.2, θL = 0.5) (θp = 0.4, θL = 0.3)
A=0.10 A=1.0 A=0.10 A=1.0 A=0.10 A=1.0
L∗h 0.2494 0.8405 0.2389 0.8201 0.2569 0.8716
p∗h 11.3255 11.2436 10.8152 10.6938 10.3582 10.3639
p∗l 8.1929 8.6429 8.5642 9.0487 8.8789 9.2512
µ∗h 22.5768 9.1010 23.5846 9.2912 22.1447 8.9103
µ∗l 8.1702 7.8552 7.9799 7.8102 8.0587 7.8359
2.4.2 Shared Capacity Setting
The shared capacity model PDTDPSC is relatively more challenging to solve, espe-
cially in the absence of an analytical characterization of the delivery time reliability
constraint (2.8) for regular customers. While the Laplace transform of the sojourn
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time distribution Sl(·), appearing in (2.8), and its first few moments are well known
(see Stephan 1958, Cohen 1982, Heyman and Sobel 1982), the distribution itself is
somewhat complicated and requires numerical computation for the inverse Laplace
transform, thereby preventing its analytical characterization. There are approx-
imations proposed in the literature for the sojourn time distribution. However,
they are very complex and often not sufficiently accurate (Abate and Whitt 1997).
Moreover, the appropriate form of approximation to use depends on the relative
demand rates of the two customer classes, which can only be determined endoge-
nously, and are not known in advance in our model. Further, even an analytical
characterization of the sojourn time distribution or a good approximation will not
produce an analytical solution similar to that for PDTDPDC since it cannot be
guaranteed at the outset which of the constraints will be binding at optimality. So
PDTDPSC does not lend itself to an easy solution using conventional optimiza-
tion methods. We resolve this difficulty by solving it in two stages. We first solve
PDTDPSC for a fixed Lh (we term it as Pricing Decision Problem (PDPSC)) nu-
merically using the matrix geometric method in a cutting plane framework. We are
able to obtain some analytical results for PDPSC for the special case where Lh is
sufficiently small. However, it is not possible to provide a rigorous mathematical
proof for these results in absence of any analytical characterization of Sl(·). We,
therefore, state these analytical results in a shared capacity case as observations
rather than as propositions. Solution to PDPSC is then used to solve PDTDPSC
using the golden section search method. Again, some analytical results are possible
for PDTDPSC for the special case where A is small, which we state as observations.
We now describe the matrix geometric method to numerically evaluate the so-
journ time distribution, Skl (·), at a given point (pkh, pkl , µk) in the solution space
of PDPSC , which is used in the solution algorithm for PDPSC and PDTDPSC .
We refer the reader to Neuts (1981) and Nelson (1991) for details of the matrix
geometric method. The use of the matrix geometric method yields explicit recur-
sive formulas for the joint stationary queue length distribution, which can provide
significant computational improvements over the transform techniques also in use
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(Miller 1981). Another recursive relation for the joint stationary queue length dis-
tribution has been obtained by White and Christie (1958). However, the use of the
matrix geometric method also provides a recursive formula for Skl (·). Moreover, the
matrix geometric method gives exact solutions, in contrast to simulation, which is
another alternative method to evaluate Skl (·) that at best gives point estimates.
The matrix geometric method is also computationally efficient compared to sim-
ulation. This is important in solving PDTDPSC , which requires solving PDPSC
repeatedly for different values of Lh.
Matrix Geometric Method
Joint Stationary Queue Length Distribution: If we define Nh(t) and Nl(t) as state
variables representing the number of high and low priority customers in the system
at time t, then {N(t)} := {Nl(t), Nh(t), t ≥ 0} is a continuous-time two-dimensional
Markov chain with state space {n = (nl, nh)}. The key idea we employ here is that
{N(t)} is a quasi-birth-and-death (QBD) process, which allows us to develop a
matrix geometric solution for the joint distribution of the number of customers
of each class in the system. A simple implementation of the matrix geometric
method, however, requires the number of states in the QBD process to be finite.
For this, we treat the queue length of high priority customers (including the one
in service) to be of finite size M , but of size large enough for the desired accuracy
of our results. Since high priority customers are always served in priority over low
priority customers, it is reasonable to assume that its queue size will always be
bounded by some large number.
In the Markov process {N(t)}, a transition can occur only if a customer of either
class arrives or a customer of either class is served. The possible transitions are





k) are obtained using
(2.1) and (2.2), respectively.
The infinitesimal generator Q associated with our system description is thus block-
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Table 2.7: Transition rates for the priority queue
From To Rate Condition
(nl, nh) (nl, nh + 1) λh for nl ≥ 0, nh ≥ 0
(nl, nh) (nl + 1, nh) λl for nl ≥ 0, nh ≥ 0
(nl, nh) (nl, nh − 1) µ for nl ≥ 0, nh > 0







. . . . . . . . .

where B0, A0, A1, A2 are square matrices of order M + 1. These matrices can be

























. . . . . . . . .
µ ∗

where ∗ is determined such that A0e + B0e = 0 is satisfied. A1 = B0 − A2.
We denote x as the stationary probability vector of {N(t)}:
x = [x00, x01, . . . , x0M , x10, x11, . . . , x1M , . . . , . . . , xi0, xi1, . . . , xiM , . . . , . . .]
The vector x can be partitioned by levels into sub vectors xi, i ≥ 0, where xi =
[xi0, xi1, . . ., xiM ] is the stationary probability of states in level i (nl = i). Thus,
x = [x0,x1,x2,x3, . . . , . . .]. x can be obtained using a set of balance equations, given
in matrix form, by the following standard relations (Latouche and Ramaswami 1999,
Nelson 1991, Neuts 1981):
xQ = 0; xi+1 = xiR
where R is the minimal non-negative solution to the matrix quadratic equation:
A0 + RA1 + R
2A2 = 0
The matrix R can be computed using well known methods (Latouche and Ra-
maswami 1999). A simple iterative procedure often used is:






The probabilities x0 are determined from:
x0(B0 + RA2) = 0
subject to the normalization equation:
∞∑
i=0
xie = x0(I −R)−1e = 1
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where e is a column vector of ones of size M + 1.
We are aware that there are other recursive relations, not based on the matrix
geometic method, in the literature to compute the joint stationary probabilities (see
White and Christie 1958). However, the use of matrix geomatric method gives us
the matrix R, required in the computation of Sl(·). We are also aware that there is
a specialized method presented by Miller (1981) that exploits the special structure
of the R matrix to compute the joint stationary probabilities for M/M/1 priority
queues. However, we use the more general method since our main focus is on the
managerial insights generated from our research, and not as much on the elegance
of the solution algorithm.
Estimation of Sl(·): The delivery time Wl of a low priority customer is the time
between its arrival to the system till it completes service. It may be preempted by
one or more high priority customers for service. So it is difficult to characterize the
distribution Sl(·). Ramaswami and Lucantoni (1985) present an efficient algorithm
based on uniformization to derive the complimentary distribution function of the
stationary waiting times in phase-type and QBD processes. The same approach is
used by Leemans (2001) to derive the complimentary distribution of waiting times
in a more complex queuing system. We adopt their algorithm to derive Sl(·), the
distribution of the waiting time plus the time in service of low priority customers.
Consider a tagged low priority customer entering the system. The time spent
by the tagged customer depends on the number of customers of either class al-
ready present in the system ahead of it, and also on the number of subsequent
high priority arrivals before it completes its service. All subsequent low priority
arrivals, however, have no influence on its time spent in the system. The tagged
customer’s time in the system is, therefore, simply the time until absorption in a
modified Markov process {Ñ(t)}, obtained by setting λl = 0. Consequently, matrix
Ã0, representing transitions to a higher level, becomes a zero matrix. We define
an absorbing state, call it state 0
′
, as the state in which the tagged customer has





0 0 0 0 0 · · ·
b0 B̃0 0
0 A2 Ã1 0
0 A2 Ã1 0
...
. . . . . . . . .

where B̃0 = B0+A0; Ã1 = A1+A0; and b0 = [µ 0 · · · 0]TM+1. The first row and
column in Q̃ corresponds to the absorbing state 0́. The time spent in system by the
tagged customer, which is the time until absorption in the modified Markov process
with rate matrix Q̃, depends on the prices (ph and pl), through the arrival rates




l ) and service rate µ
k,
the distribution of the time spent by a low priority customer in the system is Skl (y)
= 1−Skl (y), where Skl (y) is the stationary probability that a low priority customer
spends more than y units of time in the system. Further, let Skli(y) denote the
conditional probability that a tagged customer, who finds i low priority customers
ahead of it, spends a time exceeding y in the system. The probability that a tagged
customer finds i low priority customers is given, using the PASTA property (see
Wolff 1982), by xi = x0R





Skli(y) can be computed more conveniently by uniformizing the Markov process





− (A0 + A1)ii
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Q̃ + I =

1 0 0 0 0 · · ·
b̂0 B̂0 0
0 Â2 Â1 0
0 Â2 Â1 0
...








+ I, b̂0 =
b0
γ
. In this uniformized process, points of a
Poisson process are generated with a rate γ, and transitions occur at these epochs




Suppose the tagged customer finds i low priority customers ahead of it. Then, for
its time in system to exceed y, at most i of the n Poisson points may correspond










G(n)v e, i ≥ 0 (2.18)
where, G
(n)
v is a matrix such that its entries are the conditional probabilities, given
that the system has made n transitions in the discrete-time Markov process with
rate matrix Q̂, that v of those transitions correspond to lower levels (i.e., service
completions of low priority customers). Substituting the expression for Skli(y) from











































































since G(n)v = 0 for v > n
)















Hn can be computed recursively as:
Hn+1 = HnÂ1 + RHnÂ2; H0 = I
Therefore, for given prices (pkh, p
k
l ) and service rate (µ
k), Skl (·) can be computed
using (2.21).
Example 2.4: Assume the parameter values as shown in Table 2.3. Further,
assume Lh = 0.5, ph = 10.7585, pl = 8.5297, µ = 13.1853. Substituting these
values in the demand model (2.1) - (2.2) gives λh = 3.9750 and λl = 3.5250.
The service level Sl(Lh = 0.5) for regular customers, obtained using the matrix
geometric method, is 0.968901.
The above example shows that for the given prices and delivery times, the
capacity level of µ = 13.1853 is insufficient to provide the target service level of
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0.99 to regular customers, and the firm either needs to invest more in its capacity
level or alter its prices and/or delivery times to influence its regular demands in
such a way that they can be served with a 99% reliability.
Example 2.5: Assume again the parameter values as shown in Table 2.3. Now
assume a different set of values for the decision variables: Lh = 0.5, ph = 10.9061,
pl = 8.7012, µ = 14.7843. The service level Sl(Lh = 0.5) now is 0.9900.
This example shows that for the given prices and delivery times, the capacity
level of µ = 14.7843 is just sufficient to provide the target service level of 0.99 to
regular customers. Thus, the firm is able to satisfy the guaranteed service level by
investing in its capacity level, which not only allows it to serve its regular customers
with the desired reliability but also to charge higher prices to its regular as well
as express customers. The net effect of this change in prices on customer demands
is a drop in λh and λl from 3.9750 and 3.5250 to 3.9060 and 3.4001, respectively,
allowing the firm to meet the new demand level λl reliably.
We now state an important property of Sl(·) based on our extensive numerical
experiments, which provides the basis for the cutting plane method, described in
the next section, to solve PDPSC .
Property 2.4. The sojourn time distribution of regular customers, Sl(·), in a
shared capacity setting is:
• concave in (ph, pl)
• concave in µ.
Figure 2.3 shows plots of Sl(·) vs. (ph, pl), and Sl(·) vs. µ, obtained using the matrix
geometrix method described above. These plots suggest that Sl(·) is concave in (ph,
pl) and separately in µ, although it is not possible to prove it mathematically in
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(b) lS vs. μ  
 
Figure 2.3: Service level vs. prices and capacity
Pricing Decision Problem (PDPSC)
We first solve the firm’s optimization problem for a fixed Lh, which reduces it to
a Pricing Decision Problem, which we denote as PDPSC . On substituting (2.1)
and (2.2) into (2.3), the objective function for PDPSC is quadratic and concave.
All constraints but (2.8), which does not have a closed form expression, are linear.
Although the exact form of Sl(·) in constraint (2.8) is unknown, we exploit its special
structure, determined numerically using the matrix geometric method. Property
2.4 suggests that for a fixed Lh, Sl(·) is concave in (ph, pl) and separately in µ.
However, this does not necessarily show the joint concavity of Sl(·) in (ph, pl, µ).
We will, therefore, integrate into our solution method a mechanism to ensure that
the concavity assumption is not violated.
Assuming Sl(·) is concave, it can be approximated by a set of tangent hyper-
planes at various points (pkh, p
k
l , µ
































Figure 2.4: Piecewise linear approximation of Sl(·)
















≥ α ∀k ∈ K (2.22)
Substituting the above set of constraints in place of (2.8), and the expressions (2.1)
and (2.2) for λh and λl results in the following quadratic programming problem
(QPP) with a finite but a large number of constraints, which makes it suitable for





π = −(βhp + θp)p2h − (βlp + θp)p2l + 2θpphpl
+
{





−βlLLl + θL(Lh − Ll) + mβlp + a
}
pl
− Aµ + (βhLLh + βlLLl)m− 2ma (2.23)
subject to:
− (βhp + θp)ph + θppl − µ ≤
ln(1− α)
Lh




























µk ∀k ∈ K (2.25)
− βhp ph − βlppl − µ < βhLLh + βlLLl − 2a (2.26)
− (βhp + θp)ph + θppl ≥ (βhL + θL)Lh − θLLl − a (2.27)
θpph − (βlp + θp)pl ≥ −θLLh + (βlL + θL)Ll − a (2.28)
ph, pl, µ ≥ 0 (2.29)
Proposition 2.5. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions are both necessary
and sufficient for the global optimal solution of PDP(K).
Proof. The Hessian of (2.23) is given by:

−2(βhp + θp) 2θp 0
2θp −2(βlp + θp) 0
0 0 0

This shows that the Hessian is negative semidefinite. Therefore, PDP(K) has
a quadratic concave objective function. Moreover, all its constraints are linear.
Hence, KKT conditions are both necessary and sufficient for its global optimal
solution (Luenberger 1984).
PDP(K) can be solved using any of the standard algorithms like Wolfe’s Algo-
rithm (Cooper 1974, Wolfe 1959). We use the matrix geometric method, described
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in §2.4.2, to numerically evaluate Skl (·) at a given point (pkh, pkl , µk). Once Skl (·) is
evaluated at a point (pkh, p
k
l , µ
k), its gradients are obtained using the finite difference
method, described below.
Estimation of the Gradient of Sl(·): There are several methods available in the lit-
erature to compute the gradients of Sl(·) (Carson and Maria 1997, Andradottir
1998). We use a finite difference method as it is probably the simplest and most
intuitive, and can be easily explained (Atlason et al. 2004). Using the finite differ-


































where dph, dpl and dµ (referred to as step sizes) are infinitesimal changes in the
respective variables. These estimates of the gradients are used in the cutting plane
algorithm to generate constraints/cuts of the form (2.25), which are added itera-
tively in the cutting plane algorithm, described next.
Cutting Plane Algorithm: We now describe the cutting plane algorithm to solve
PDP(K). The algorithm fits the framework of Kelley’s cutting plane method (Kel-
ley 1960). It differs from the traditional description of the algorithm in that we
use the matrix geometric method to generate the cuts and evaluate the function
values instead of having an algebraic form for the function and using analytically
determined gradients to generate the cuts. Figure 2.5 shows a flowchart of the
cutting plane algorithm. The algorithm works as follows: We start with an empty















l (·) meets the delivery time reliability constraint α,
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empty. 
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using finite difference method. Generate 
a cut of the form (2.25). 
Figure 2.5: Cutting Plane Algorithm
constraint/cut generated using the finite difference method. The new cut eliminates
the current solution but does not eliminate any feasible solution to PDP(K). This
procedure repeats until the delivery time reliability constraint is satisfied within a
sufficiently small tolerance limit ε such that |Sl(·)− α| ≤ ε. The method has been
proved to converge (Atlason et al. 2004).
The success of the cutting plane algorithm relies on the concavity of Sl(·). We
have already demonstrated, using computational results obtained by the matrix
geometric method, that Sl(·) is concave in (ph, pl) and separately concave in µ.
However, it is difficult to establish the joint concavity of Sl(·) in (ph, pl, µ). If
the concavity assumption is violated, then the algorithm may cut off parts of the
feasible region and terminate with a solution that is suboptimal. We include a
test to ensure the concavity assumption is not violated. This is done by ensuring
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that a new point, visited by the cutting plane algorithm after each iteration, lies
below all the previously defined cuts, and that all previous points lie below the
newly added cut. The test, however, cannot ensure that Sl(·) is concave unless it
examines all the points in the feasible region. Still, it does help ensure that the
concavity assumption is not violated at least in the region visited by the algorithm.
Details of the test can be found in Atlason et al. (2004).
Example 2.6: Assume the parameter values as shown in Table 2.3. For Lh = 0.5,




π = −0.70p2h − 0.90p2l + 0.40phpl + 11.30ph + 11.15pl − 0.50µ− 56.55
subject to:
− 0.70ph + 0.20pl − µ ≤ −19.0103
− 0.50ph − 0.70pl − µ < −18.85
− 0.70ph + 0.20pl ≥ −9.80
0.20ph − 0.90pl ≥ −9.05
ph, pl, µ ≥ 0
For the solution algorithm, a bound (M) on the high priority queue size needs to be
specified to facilitate use of the matrix geometric method. Finding an appropriate
value of M requires some experimentation. Computational experiments of a priority
queue with a reasonable range of parameter values suggested M = 100 to be a good
choice with little effect on the accuracy of results. For the cutting plane algorithm,
we set the tolerance limit (ε) at 10−6, and the step sizes (dph, dpl, dµ) for gradient
estimation at 0.001. Table 2.8 shows the results of successive iterations. The
optimal solution is (ph = 10.9061, pl = 8.7012, µ = 14.7843), which is obtained
after 5 iterarions. Computational results, showing the number of cuts used and
the time (in seconds) taken by the algorithm for a range of parameters values, are
reported in Table 2.9. All computations are performed on a Pentium IV (3.06 GHz,
512 MB RAM) machine. The results suggest that the proposed algorithm is very
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efficient, taking only a few seconds.
Table 2.8: Iterations of the cutting plane algorithm
Iter. (ph, pl, µ) (Sh(Lh), Sl(Ll)) Cut generated
0 (10.7585, 8.5297, 13.1853) (0.990000, 0.968901) 0.0170ph + 0.0074pl + 0.0195µ ≥ 0.5243
1 (10.8725, 8.7163, 14.0965) (0.993793, 0.984251) 0.0093ph + 0.0033pl + 0.0100µ ≥ 0.2760
2 (10.8935, 8.7062, 14.6575) (0.995350, 0.989084) 0.0067ph + 0.0021pl + 0.0069µ ≥ 0.1945
3 (10.9038, 8.7020, 14.7807) (0.995645, 0.989964) 0.0062ph + 0.0019pl + 0.0064µ ≥ 0.1794
4 (10.9061, 8.7012, 14.7843) (0.995657, 0.990000) not needed
Table 2.9: Performance of the cutting plane algorithm
A → 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Lh ↓ Cuts T ime Cuts T ime Cuts T ime Cuts T ime Cuts T ime
0.10 0 0.08 0 0.09 0 0.08 0 0.05 0 0.09
0.20 0 0.08 0 0.11 0 0.08 0 0.09 0 0.08
0.30 0 0.09 0 0.08 0 0.08 0 0.09 0 0.09
0.40 0 0.13 0 0.17 0 0.16 0 0.13 0 0.16
0.50 4 3.81 4 3.16 4 2.42 4 2.39 4 2.38
0.60 5 3.17 5 3.16 5 3.14 5 3.13 5 3.14
0.70 6 4.02 6 4.03 6 4.02 6 3.95 6 3.94
0.80 6 4.48 6 4.47 6 4.39 6 4.42 6 4.41
0.90 7 5.7 7 5.7 7 5.67 7 5.63 7 5.59
An important observation to make from Table 2.9 is that the number of cuts
generated by the algorithm is always 0 when Lh is small (≤ 0.40 in the above ex-
ample). This means that the complicating delivery time reliability constraint for
regular customers, which lacked any analytical characterization, is never binding at
optimality for small Lh. This is depicted in Figure 2.6 in which the threshold value
of Lh below which the delivery time reliability constraint for regular customers is
never binding is indicated as LTh . Although this is depicted for a specific combina-
tion of parameter values, this is true in general. To give an intuitive explanation
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for this observation, we first state the following proposition.

































Figure 2.6: Service levels for high and low priority customers in a shared capacity
setting
Proposition 2.6. In a shared capacity setting, at least one of the delivery time
reliability constraints is binding at optimality.
Proof. Delivery time reliability constraint for express customers (2.7SC) can be
restated as:




Although the actual analytical characterization of delivery time reliability con-
straint for regular customers is unknown, we still know that the service level always
increases with the service rate, irrespective of the priority discipline. This implies
that:
µ ≥ µαl (2.31)
where µαl is the minimum service rate required to meet the desired service level α
for low priority customers. Combining (2.30) and (2.31), we have:
µ ≥ max{µαh , µαl } (2.32)
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Further, the profit function π is decreasing in µ. Therefore, to maximize profit, the
service rate µ should be at its minimum level that guarantees the desired service
level α for the two customer classes. This implies that at optimality, (2.32) should
hold with equality, which means that at least one of the delivery time reliability
constraints should be binding. Thus, the service rate at optimality is given by:
µ = max{µαh , µαl } (2.33)
Clearly, µαh increases as Lh decreases. Further, λl decreases as Lh decreases.
This suggests that for Lh sufficiently small, µ = max{µαh , µαl } = µαh such that the
capacity requirement is dictated solely by the demand from express customers. This
allows us to solve PDPSC analytically for small Lh. We state this result formally
as an observation rather than a proposition since in the absence of an analytical
expression for Sl(·), we are unable to provide a rigorous mathematical proof.






(βlp + 2θp)a− (βlpβhL + βlpθL + βhLθp)Lh + (βlpθL − βlLθp)Ll






(βhp + 2θp)a + (β
h
p θL − βhLθp)Lh − (βhp βlL + βhp θL + βlLθp)Ll
2(βhp βlp + βhp θp + βlpθp)
(2.35)
As noted earlier in §2.3.2, the stability condition (2.6SC) is automatically satisfied
by the two delivery time reliability constraints of PDTDPSC or PDPSC . Further,
we observe that for small Lh, the service rate µ is decided solely by the delivery
time reliability constraint for express customers, such that:
µ = λh −
ln(1− α)
Lh
Substituting the expression for µ in the objective function, pSC∗h (Lh) and p
SC∗
l (Lh)
can be obtained by solving simultaneously ∂π/∂ph = 0 and ∂π/∂pl = 0, in very
much the same way as we did for the dedicated capacity case.
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When the prices are described by the above relations (2.34) and (2.35), it can
be shown that a small Lh, in fact, results in a relatively large express demand
compared to regular demand, such that the capacity requirement µ is dictated only





























This suggests that when Lh gets sufficiently small, express demand gets much larger
compared to regular demand. Thus, the capacity requirement µ is dictated only
by the demand from express customers, something we used to arrive at the results
(2.34) and (2.35) at first place.
Observation 2.1 is important in that it provides us some basis to compare the
pricing decisions in a shared versus dedicated capacity settings when the delivery
times are fixed.
Pricing and Delivery Time Decision Problem
The Pricing and Delivery Time Decision Problem (PDTDPSC) adds an additional
dimension to PDPSC by treating Lh as a decision variable, which the firm tries
to jointly optimize along with ph, pl and µ. This makes constraint (2.7
SC) non-
linear, and the model substantially more challenging to solve. We use the solution
to PDPSC and the golden section search method (Luenberger 1984, Winston and




where f(Lh) is a PDPSC for a fixed Lh. We have shown in a dedicated capacity
setting that f(Lh) has a unique maximum when a is high. Our extensive numerical
56
experiments with f(Lh) suggests that a sufficiently large a guarantees that f(Lh)
has a unique maximum in a shared capacity setting as well, and hence PDTDPSC
can be solved efficiently using the golden section search method. At each step, the
algorithm solves PDPSC to evaluate f(Lh) for a given value of Lh.
Example 2.7: Assume the parameter values as shown in Table 2.3. The optimal
decisions, demand and profit for a shared capacity setting are shown in Table 2.10.










0.5562 10.7032 8.7830 12.2653 3.9857 3.3141 39.7753
Example 2.8: Table 2.11 shows the optimal price, delivery time and capacity
decisions for the parameter combinations shown in Table 2.3 and for various com-
binations of substitution parameters and capacity cost.
Table 2.11: Results for Example 2.8
Without substitution With substitution
(θp = θL = 0) (θp = 0.2, θL = 0.5) (θp = 0.4, θL = 0.3)
A=0.10 A=1.0 A=0.10 A=1.0 A=0.10 A=1.0
L∗h 0.2494 0.42755 0.2393 0.4277 0.2572 0.4276
p∗h 11.3255 11.8355 10.8148 11.2960 10.3580 10.9126
p∗l 8.1429 8.3985 8.5142 8.7753 8.8289 9.0739
µ∗ 22.5774 14.4659 23.5440 14.5170 22.1047 14.3657
Observation 2.2. When A is small, the optimal express delivery time LSC∗h is













− A ln(1− α)
L2h
(2.36)
where, pSC∗h (Lh) and p
SC∗
l (Lh) are given by (2.34) and (2.35).
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We know from Observation 2.1 that when Lh is known to be small (≤ LTh ),
pSC∗h (Lh) and p
SC∗
l (Lh) can be obtained using (2.34) and (2.35). Substituting
pSC∗h (Lh) and p
SC∗
l (Lh), given by (2.34) and (2.35), in the profit function π, and dif-







are given by the same relations (2.14) and (2.15) as for the dedicated capacity case.
Thus, for small A, the properties 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 of π hold true in a shared capacity
case as well. This implies that for a sufficiently high, π has a unique maximum, as
shown in Figure 2.2, given by the root of (2.36).
We obtain the above result assuming that Lh is known to be small. We now
show that when A is small, LSC∗h is indeed small, such that the above result holds






































This implies that LSC∗h is increasing in A. Therefore, a sufficiently small A guaran-
tees that L∗h is small, which we used at first place to arrive at the result.
2.5 Conclusions
In this chapter, we developed the modelling framework to study the optimal prod-
uct differentiation strategy of a firm selling two ”products”, which are similar in all
respect except in their prices and guaranteed delivery times, in a capacitated envi-
ronment. Our primary objective was to understand how the demand-side product
substitution and the supply-side operations strategy of the firm (using dedicated
versus shared capacity) affect the optimal pricing and delivery time decisions as
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well as the optimal capacity level. For this, we developed a general mathematical
model, special cases of which capture different scenarios depending on whether the
products are substitutable or not, and whether the capacity strategy is shared or
dedicated. The dedicated capacity setting allowed us to obtain analytical results.
From a technical perspective, our methodology for dealing with the analytically-
difficult shared capacity setting is somewhat novel. This involved linking a matrix
geometric model for queuing performance analysis to a cutting plane algorithm for
optimization.
In the following chapter, we use the solution methods developed in this chapter




Monopolistic Market: Analysis &
Insights
In chapter 2, we developed a general mathematical model PDTDP for a firm’s pric-
ing and delivery time decision problem. We further studied how the same model
can be adapted for the four different scenarios described in §2.1, and discussed
the solution approach for each. We now study the different scenarios described in
§2.1, and address the research issues posed therein. Specifically, we first study the
individual and joint roles played by product substitution and a firm’s operations
(capacity) strategy in shaping its price and delivery time differentiation decisions.
We then investigate how rising capacity costs affect product differentiation pol-
icy under different demand and supply conditions. Since the mathematical model
for the shared capacity scenario does not, in general, have an analytical solution,
we test our models numerically under different combinations of parameter values.
Generalizations based on observable patterns that emerge from these numerical
experiments are reported as observations. From these observations, we derive con-
clusions of managerial interest.
We first discuss the results for the pricing decision problem (PDP) for fixed de-
livery times. As discussed in chapter 2, PDP is appropriate when there is stickiness
in a firm’s delivery time decisions. Then we discuss the more general problem of
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pricing and delivery time decision (PDTDP).
3.1 Numerical Experiment Design
Our model setting described in chapter 2 involves the following parameters: a, m,
α, Ll and A. Of these, we fix the value of Ll = 1 (so, delivery time differential
= 1−L∗h). As regards the other parameters, we experiment with a large combination
of their values as given in Table 3.1:
Table 3.1: Parameter settings for numerical experiments
Parameter Number of Choices Possible Values
a 5 {10, 50, 100, 200, 400}
m 6 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
A 6 {0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1, 2}
α 5 {0.95, 0.96, 0.97, 0.98, 0.99}
Note that not all possible combination of values given in Table 3.1 are used in
our experiment. An important assumption we have made throughout is that a is
sufficiently high (see Assumption 2.1). This was required to guarantee a unique
L∗h that maximizes a firm’s profit. We use only those combinations of parameter
values from Table 3.1 that make a sufficiently large for our purpose. However, the
figures that we present in this chapter use a = 10, m = 3, α = 0.99, A = 0.5
(unless otherwise stated). Since the behavior of the prices depends on the market
characteristics, we compare their optimal values under the different market settings.
We use the following market parameter values:
• Time Difference Sensitive (TDS): βhp = 0.5, βlp = 0.7, βhL = 0.9, βlL = 0.7,









• Price Difference Sensitive (PDS): βhp = 0.5, βlp = 0.7, βhL = 0.9, βlL = 0.7,










3.2 Pricing Decision Problem
In this section, we assume the firm faces a significantly higher stickiness for their
delivery time decisions compared to their ability to vary prices. Situations in which
such a model will be more relevant are discussed in chapter 2. Under such situations,
a firm optimizes its prices, treating its delivery times as fixed.
We start by studying the behavior of the optimal prices in response to a change
in the guaranteed express delivery time Lh in each of the four scenarios. First of
all, a change in operating philosophy from dedicated to shared capacity setting has
no effect on the way the two prices behave with respect to Lh, except for a sudden
jump in their values at a specific value of Lh, denoted as L
T
h , in a shared capacity
setting. LTh is the value of Lh at which delivery time reliability constraint is binding
for both the classes of customers (refer to Figure 2.6). Product substitution, on the
other hand, affects the behavior of regular price only. Figure 3.1 shows the behavior
of the two prices under different scenarios as we vary Lh, which is summarized in
the following observation:
Observation 3.1. In both the dedicated capacity (DC) and the shared capacity
(SC) settings, a decrease in Lh results in (Refer to Figure 3.1): (a) an increase in












p ; and no
change in p∗l if θp = θL = 0.
In a DC setting as well as for small A in an SC setting, the above observation follows
directly from Proposition 2.2 and Observation 2.1. Figure 3.1 shows the behavior of
the two prices in different scenarios as we vary Lh. This behavior is quite intuitive
and is similar to what has been shown by Boyaci and Ray (2003) for the dedicated
capacity case. Since express customers are time-sensitive, a firm can always charge
them a higher price for a guaranteed shorter delivery time, as also evident from the
expressions for the optimal prices ((2.10) and (2.11) for DC and (2.34) and (2.35)
for SC). However, in absence of product substitution (θp = θL = 0), customers
from a given class are not concerned about what is offered to the other class.
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Thus, the price charged to regular customers is unaffected by any change in the
delivery time guaranteed to the express ones (see (2.11) and (2.35)). With product
substitution, the behavior of the optimal price for the regular class depends on the
market conditions. In a TDS type market, the relative sensitivity of customers to
the difference in delivery times (with respect to their own delivery times) is greater
than their relative sensitivity to the price difference (with respect to their own




p , k ∈ {l, h}. In such a market, a decrease in Lh
results in a small gain in new express customers but a relatively larger number of
regular customers switch to the express option. By increasing ph and decreasing
pl simultaneously, the firm can attract new regular customers without causing a
significant number of express customers to switch option, thus increasing the profit.





























































































































(c) Neither TDS nor PDS 
 
Figure 3.1: Comparison of prices in the four different scenarios
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On the other hand, in a PDS type market, the relative sensitivity of customers
to the difference in delivery times (with respect to their own delivery times) is
less than their relative sensitivity to the price difference (with respect to their own




p , k ∈ {l, h}. In such a market, reducing Lh
attracts a significant number of new customers who choose the express delivery
option but relatively few of the regular customers switch to the express delivery
option. Since customers preference between the two options is driven mainly by the
price difference now, the firm cannot afford to increase the price difference, which
will cause a significant number of express customers to switch options, causing a
loss of profit. Thus the optimal strategy for the firm is to increase the price for the
regular customers corresponding to an increase in price for the express customers.
We next do a comparison of the values of the optimal prices in the four scenarios
to study the effects of product substitution and capacity strategy.
Observation 3.2. If the express delivery time Lh is fixed and is sufficiently small,
the relations shown in Table 3.2 hold between DC and SC.
Table 3.2: Comparison between DC and SC when Lh is given and sufficiently small


















µSC∗ < µDC∗h + µ
DC∗
l
The relation between the prices in the two capacity settings follow directly by
comparing (2.10) with (2.34) and (2.11) with (2.35). The relation between the
demands can be explained by comparing the resulting demand functions obtained
by substituting the prices (pDC∗h , p
DC∗




l ) in the demand model (2.1)
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and (2.2). These relations suggest that when the express delivery time is sufficiently
small, regular customers get a better price from the firm using shared capacities.
For the relation between the capacity requirements in the two settings, we have:












= µDC∗h + µ
DC∗
l
This shows that when Lh is chosen to be small, a firm that shares its capacities
achieves the benefits of capacity pooling. This is a well established fact and holds
true even for larger Lh, as our numerical results suggest. However, the other rela-
tions between individual prices and demand may not hold true for larger Lh. The
next observation shows a comparison between the two capacity settings that hold
true irrespective of the value of the express delivery time chosen by a firm.
Observation 3.3. For a given delivery time differentiation (Refer to Figure 3.1):
- a change in capacity strategy from dedicated to shared results in (a) a generally
higher p∗h, (b) a lower p
∗
l , and hence (c) a higher optimal price differentiation
- introduction of product substitutability results in (a) a lower p∗h, (b) a higher p
∗
l ,
and hence (c) a lower optimal price differentiation.
Managerially speaking, the above observation is significant. It shows that for
a capacitated, pure-price competition environment, a firm’s operations strategy
(dedicated or shared capacity), as well as its marketing strategy (whether to make
the products available for all market segments or to customize them for separate
segments), affects both the absolute product prices as well as the optimal product
differentiation. For small capacity costs, this observation follows directly from
the comparison of the optimal prices in the two capacity settings, as given by
Proposition 2.3 and Observation 2.1, respectively. Comparing the prices in the two
settings, we see that the price for express customers remains the same, whereas that
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for regular customers in SC decreases by a constant amount A/2, thereby increasing
the price differentiation.
As Lh increases, demand for express customers decreases, while that for regular
customers increases. The supply system then faces increasing pressure to satisfy
the demand from regular customers. Indeed, beyond LTh , the supply capacity in SC
is dictated solely by the demand from regular customers. The problem is difficult
to solve analytically in absence of a closed form expression for constraint (2.25).
However, the numerical results suggest that as Lh increases to L
T
h , the firm needs to
suddenly increase the prices for both the products. This further increases the price
difference for express customers between the two capacity settings, and decreases it
for regular customers. The price differentiation between the two customer classes
is still higher in SC compared to DC.
The effect of product substitution in a dedicated capacity setting follows directly
































p θp + β
l
pθp)
The above relations show that for a sufficiently high a (Assumption 2.2), ph de-
creases whereas pl increases with substitution. The net result is a decrease in price
differentiation. The effect is most pronounced when the market is simultaneously
TDS for express customers and PDS for regular customers. The effect of product
substitution in a shared capacity setting for small Lh can be explained similarly by
substituting θp = θL = 0 in (2.34) and (2.35).
It is important to point out here that the effect of product substitution on the
two prices for a given delivery time differentiation has been studied by Boyaci and
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Ray (2003), albeit only in a dedicated capacity setting. However, their results dif-
fer significantly from ours. Their results suggest that product substitution may
increase or decrease price differentiation, depending on the customers’ behavior.
Our results, in contrast, suggest that product substitution, for a given delivery
time differentiation, always results in a lower price differentiation, irrespective of
customers’ behavior. This difference in the two results arises due to the difference
in the modelling assumptions made. Boyaci and Ray (2003) use the same (price
and delivery time) sensitivities (βhp = β
l




L = βL) for the two customer
classes, even though the customers are essentially categorized as price or time sen-
sitive only based on the difference in their price and delivery time sensitivities.
Observation 3.4. A change in capacity strategy from dedicated to shared results
in higher profits, whereas introducing substitutability erodes profit. The effect, in
general, is stronger at higher delivery time differentiation. (Refer to Figure 3.2).














































(a) TDS (b) PDS 
 

































(c) Neither TDS nor PDS 
 
Figure 3.2: % Profit gain for different scenarios over the “non-substitutable prod-
ucts; dedicated capacity” scenario
Figure 3.2 shows the % gain in profit in different scenarios over the “non-substitutable
products; dedicated capacity” scenario. Regardless of the market characteristics,
shared compared to dedicated capacity always leads to higher profits. The relative
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gain in profit in SC over DC increases with an increase in the delivery time differ-
entiation (decrease in Lh). This gain in profit is attributed mostly to the savings in
capacity related costs due to capacity pooling in SC. A unit decrease in the express
delivery time Lh (corresponding to a unit increase in the delivery time differentia-
tion) generates additional demand from express customers at a rate of (βhL + θL),
out of which βhL are new customers and θL are regular customers who now switch to
the express delivery option. The net result is an increase in the total demand at a
rate βhL. A larger delivery time differentiation, therefore, leads to a larger capacity
required to serve the increased demand, which increases the savings due to capacity
pooling in SC. An increase in capacity cost will, therefore, increase such a gain in
profit. Product substitution, on the other hand, results in lower profits. This is
consistent with the revenue management theory, which suggests that a properly
designed fence that prevents leakage of demand from high price segment to the
low price segment enhances a firm’s profit (Zhang 2007). Results obtained in this
section are summarized in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Summary: Observations for the Pricing Decision Problem
Decision Effect of SC Effect of product
Variables compared to DC substitution
p∗h(Lh) ↑ ↓
p∗l (Lh) ↓ ↑
p∗h(Lh)− p∗l (Lh) ↑ ↓
π∗(Lh) ↑ ↓
3.3 Pricing and Delivery Time Decision Problem
The last section focussed on the optimal pricing (and price differentiation) strategy,
for a given delivery time differentiation. In this section we address the issue of
overall product differentiation - both in terms of delivery time and price. So we now
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solve the pricing and delivery time decision problems PDTDPDC and PDTDPSC .
We first study the comparison of the optimal product differentiation under the four
scenarios for a given marginal capacity cost A, and then study their behavior as A
increases.
3.3.1 Optimal Product Differentiation for a Given Marginal
Capacity Cost
We have performed extensive numerical experiments for our models for the four
different scenarios to study the effects of capacity strategy and product substitu-
tion on a firm’s price and delivery time decisions, and also on its optimal product
differentiation. We present a small sample of these studies to illustrate our compar-
ison of the optimal decisions in the four scenarios. We use the demand parameter
values as defined in §3.1 for PDS and TDS type markets. Firm specific parameters
are fixed at: a = 10, m = 3, α = 0.99, Ll = 1. We use two different values for A
to illustrate the difference in the behavior of optimal decisions in a shared capacity
setting when capacity cost is high versus when it is small: (i) A = 0.10 (small
capacity cost) (ii) A = 1.0 (high capacity cost). The results are presented in Table
3.4 for “without substitution” scenario and in Table 3.5 for “with substitution”
scenario.
Table 3.4: Numerical Results: Without Product Substitution
A = 0.10 A = 1.0
DC SC DC SC
L∗h 0.2494 0.2494 0.8405 0.42755
Ll − L∗h 0.7506 0.7506 0.1595 0.57245
p∗h 11.3255 11.3255 11.2436 11.8355
p∗l 8.1929 8.1429 8.6429 8.3985
p∗h − p
∗
l 3.1326 3.1826 2.6007 3.4370
We now state some observations, based on the above numerical results, to il-
lustrate the behavior of the optimal price and delivery time decisions of a firm,
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Table 3.5: Numerical Results: With Product Substitution
A = 0.10 A = 1.0
TDS PDS TDS PDS
DC SC DC SC DC SC DC SC
L∗h 0.2389 0.2393 0.2569 0.2572 0.8201 0.4277 0.8716 0.4276
Ll − L∗h 0.7611 0.7607 0.7431 0.7428 0.1799 0.5723 0.1284 0.5724
p∗h 10.8152 10.8148 10.3582 10.358 10.6938 11.29595 10.3639 10.9126
p∗l 8.5642 8.5142 8.8789 8.8289 9.0487 8.775273 9.2512 9.0739
p∗h − p
∗
l 2.251 2.3006 1.4793 1.5291 1.6451 2.520679 1.1127 1.8387
Table 3.6: Effect of Capacity Sharing
in absence of in presence of
product substitution product substitution
small A large A small A large A
L∗h – ↓ ↑ ↓
Ll − L∗h – ↑ ↓ ↑
p∗h – ↑ ↓ ↑
p∗l ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
p∗h − p∗l ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
Table 3.7: Effect of Product Substitution
DC SC
TDS PDS TDS PDS
small A large A small A large A
L∗h ↓ ↑ ↓ ↑ ↑ ↑
Ll − L∗h ↑ ↓ ↑ ↓ ↓ ↓
p∗h ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
p∗l ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑ ↑
p∗h − p∗l ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓
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and also its optimal product differentiation decisions, as a result of its operations
strategy or product substitution. These observations are summarized in Tables 3.6
and 3.7. These observations hold true in general, independent of the system param-
eter values chosen even though we are unable to establish such results analytically,
especially for large A for which we do not have analytical results in a shared ca-
pacity setting. Some of these observations can be explained analytically, especially
when the capacity cost A is small (see Appendix A.1). These observations are
summarized in the following:
Observation 3.5. - If a firm decides to change its operations (capacity) strategy
from dedicated to shared, then (whether the products are substitutable or not): (a)
it should increase price differentiation, and (b) should also increase delivery time
differentiation if capacity is expensive, but decrease it (or keep it at the same level)
when capacity is cheap.
- If a firm decides to make its market-customized products available to all customers
(i.e, introduces substitutability), then: (a) it should decrease price differentiation
irrespective of the capacity strategy, but (b) may need to increase or decrease deliv-
ery time differentiation, depending on the capacity strategy, market conditions and
marginal capacity cost.
Managerial Implications: It is evident from Table 3.6 that when the marginal
capacity cost is large, sharing capacities always increases both the optimal deliv-
ery time differentiation and price differentiation of a firm, regardless of the prod-
uct/market characteristics. This is in contrast to the argument presented by Boyaci
and Ray (2003) that sharing capacity will lead to “averaging” such that all cus-
tomers are served at an average speed and charged an average price. This will
happen only if the firm’s operations department does not discriminate between the
two market segments. However, as long as the firm has a mechanism to prioritize
the orders from its time sensitive customers, it is always optimal for the marketing
department to differentiate its product/service based on its price and delivery time
guarantee for the different market segments. In fact, we find that such a prior-
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ity mechanism in a shared capacity setting requires it to maintain even a higher
level of product differentiation between the two customer classes compared to the
dedicated capacity setting if the capacity cost is high.
We further look at the example of FedEx versus UPS to see if the industry
practice corroborates our finding. As noted earlier, FedEx uses separate facilities for
its express and ground services, whereas UPS delivers express and ground services
using one integrated network. Table 3.8 shows two different price and delivery
time combinations offered by FedEx1 and UPS2 for a normal package (within 1 lb)
delivery between Waterloo and Toronto, Canada. Clearly, UPS, which uses a shared
capacity policy, maintains a greater delivery time and price differentiation between
the two options offered, compared to FedEx, which uses dedicated capacity. This
seems to be in close agreement with our observation, assuming that the marginal
capacity cost is sufficiently large.
Table 3.8: Price and delivery time differentiation by FedEx vs. UPS
FedEx UPS
Service Guaranteed Rate Service Guaranteed Rate
Delivery Delivery
FedEx First by 9:00 AM $ 33.40 UPS Express by 8:00 AM $ 42.2
Overnight next day Early A.M. next day
FedEx Priority by 12:00 PM $ 18.84 UPS Express by 12:00 PM $ 15.32
Overnight next day Saver next day
The above observation also has important implications for Dell or steel, chemical
and consumer product industries, cited in §2.1, that quote a specific price and
delivery time combination to one segment of customers, which is not available to




are thus non-substitutable. If these firms decide to make their products available
across different market segments, allowing the customers to self-select their options,
then this will require them to reduce price differentiation between the different
products irrespective of the capacity strategy used. This is intuitive since the
customers’ preference for a given product are now affected not only by its absolute
price, but also by its price compared to the other option. By keeping this price
difference small, a firm can minimize the migration of customers to the lower price
option, and hence its loss of revenue. The effect on the delivery time quotation
will, however, depend on the market characteristics and capacity strategy used. In
a dedicated capacity setting, the firm’s optimal strategy will be to offer delivery time
options with a greater differentiation if the market is TDS type. This is because
increasing the delivery time difference in a TDS type market will induce more
regular customers to switch to the express option than will the price difference
cause express customers to switch to the regular option, thereby increasing its
revenue. On the other hand, in a PDS type market, the firm should offer more
homogeneous delivery time options. Since the customers are now more sensitive to
the price difference, the firm can reduce the delivery time difference, which allows
it to further decrease the price difference, thereby minimizing the migration of
customers to the lower price option. In a shared capacity environment, optimal
delivery time differentiation for a PDS type market will be the same as in DC,
but for a TDS type, market the differentiation will further depend on the firm’s
marginal capacity cost.
3.3.2 Effects of Capacity Cost Increase
Another issue of potential managerial interest is how should the product differenti-
ation strategy for a firm change as its marginal capacity cost A increases. Optimal
delivery time and price differentiation decisions under various scenarios are shown
in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 for a TDS type market and a PDS type market, respectively.
The following observation summarizes our main finding in this context.
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Observation 3.6. - For a firm using a dedicated capacity strategy, its optimal
response to any increase in marginal capacity cost is to decrease both the delivery
time differentiation as well as the price differentiation.
- For a firm using a shared capacity strategy, its optimal response to any increase
in marginal capacity cost is to decrease the delivery time differentiation and may
still need to increase the price differentiation, especially if the status-quo capacity
cost is high. (Refer to Figures 3.3 and 3.4).




































(a) Delivery time differentitaion versus marginal capacity cost 
in absence of product substitution 
(b) Price differentitaion versus marginal capacity cost in 
absence of product substitution 





































(c) Delivery time differentitaion versus marginal capacity cost 
in presence of product substitution 
(d) Price differentitaion versus marginal capacity cost in 
presence of product substitution 
 
Figure 3.3: Effects of operations strategy and product substitution in a TDS type
market
One would expect increasing capacity cost to drive the prices higher. However, when
the customers are also sensitive to the delivery time, the optimal strategy appears
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(a) Delivery time differentitaion versus marginal capacity cost 
in absence of product substitution 
(b) Price differentitaion versus marginal capacity cost in 
absence of product substitution 



































(c) Delivery time differentitaion versus marginal capacity cost 
in presence of product substitution 
(d) Price differentitaion versus marginal capacity cost in 
presence of product substitution 
 
Figure 3.4: Effects of operations strategy and product substitution in a PDS type
market
to be otherwise. The optimal strategy is to react to an increase in capacity cost by
offering longer express delivery time. Therefore, the delivery time differentiation
always decreases with an increase in the marginal capacity cost, irrespective of
the firm’s operations strategy, absence or presence of product substitution or the
market conditions. This can be intuitively explained as follows. With an increase
in capacity cost, it becomes increasingly expensive for the firm to offer a shorter
delivery time. Hence, for a given delivery time offered to the regular customers, the
optimal strategy for the firm then is to offer a longer delivery time to the express
customers, and hence reduce its delivery time differentiation. A longer express
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delivery time, in turn, decreases price differentiation in a dedicated capacity setting,
as evident from (2.12).
An increase in the capacity cost in a shared capacity setting has similar effects
if the status-quo capacity cost is small. However, the effect is more pronounced
in a dedicated capacity setting. This is because an increase in capacity cost has a
greater effect on the firm’s profit in a dedicated capacity setting due to larger total
capacity requirement. On the other hand, if the capacity cost is already high, any
further increase in cost may require the firm to increase price differentiation in a
shared capacity setting (although delivery time differentiation decreases).
Managerial Implications: Observation 3.6 suggests that rising fuel prices, which
effectively increases capacity cost, has different implications for FedEx and UPS.
The best strategy for FedEx, which operates in a dedicated capacity environment,
in such a situation is to make its products more homogeneous, both in terms of
delivery times and prices. Whereas UPS, which uses a shared capacity policy, needs
to increase the price differentiation for its products, despite making them more
homogeneous in terms of guaranteed delivery times, if the status-quo capacity cost
is already high. This is likely to induce a portion of its express customers to switch
to the regular delivery option. Note that the two firms should also be careful about
altering their decisions properly as fuel prices start going down, as has been the
case recently.
3.4 Conclusions & Future Research
In this chapter, we extensively studied the different mathematical models devel-
oped in chapter 2, which helped us generate important managerial insights. Our
analytical/numerical study of the models clearly shows that the firms’s operations
strategy as well as its policy regarding whether to customize products for different
markets or to make them available for all plays a major role in determining its
optimal prices and delivery time. In a high capacity cost business environment,
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sharing the same capacity for processing the two products results in express (regu-
lar) customers being offered faster (slower) and more expensive (cheaper) products,
compared to when there are dedicated capacities for each of them. This implies
that the firm offers products with greater differentiation under a shared capacity
setting. Interestingly, the above effect of the capacity strategy does not depend on
any end customer characteristics or whether the products are substitutable or not.
In contrast, the effects of substitutability of the products on delivery time decision
do depend on the operations strategy used by the firm and the behavior of the end
customers, in addition to the capacity cost. Specifically, the guaranteed delivery
times for the two products may be more differentiated or more homogeneous when
non-substitutable products become substitutable, depending on the values of the
three factors. However, introduction of substitutability always results in cheaper
express products and more expensive regular products, i.e., in a more homogeneous
pricing scheme. We also demonstrated that as the capacity becomes more costly,
the optimal response of the firm depends on its operations strategy, but not on
demand characteristics. In that case, a dedicated capacity firm should always re-
duce (both price and delivery time) differentiation of its products, whereas a shared
capacity firm should always offer more homogeneous delivery times, but needs to
increase or decrease the price differentiation depending on whether the system is
already highly capacitated or not, respectively.
The above results are managerially quite relevant. First of all, they show how
capacitated firms should alter their product differentiation strategy when they make
changes in their market coverage of product offerings and/or capacity strategy. We
also show that managers need to pay close attention to two other factors - capacity
cost of the business environment they are operating in and the behavior of their
end customers - both of which play crucial role in many circumstances. As we
demonstrated through the FedEx/UPS example, our results are corroborated by
real-life practice. Our analysis regarding the effects of increasing capacity cost
is especially relevant keeping in mind the volatility of fuel price, which directly
impacts capacity cost in a number of sectors. We demonstrate how managers
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should optimally respond to these changing business environments in order to gain
competitive advantage.
There are a number of directions in which this research can be extended. One
possible extension would be to develop a good approximation for the sojourn time
distribution Sl(·) of the low priority customers in a shared capacity setting, which
can be used in the optimization model to simplify its analysis. Another possible
extension may be to include the guaranteed delivery time for regular customers also
as a decision variable. This will, however, bring in additional complexity in that
determining the sufficiency condition for the optimal solution will be extremely
challenging. In our present study, when Ll is treated as fixed, finding the sufficient
condition required the profit function to be concave in Lh. This required imposing
restrictions on the demand parameter a. Treating Ll also as a variable will require
the profit function to be jointly concave in both Lh and Ll. This will require
additional restrictions on the parameter values, which is extremely challenging to
determine.
Further, in the shared capacity setting, we have assumed that the firm uses a
static priority discipline that always prioritizes express customers. Occasionally,
it may be prudent for the firm to give higher priority to regular customers when
the queue of regular customers gets sufficiently long. As such, employing a delay
dependent dynamic priority discipline (Kleinrock 1964, Kanet 1982) will be a better
strategy. This will, however, make the problem extremely challenging, especially
with service levels based on probability distribution of realized delivery times.
We have so far considered a monopolistic setting. It would be interesting to
incorporate horizontal competition in the model as has been done by So (2000),
Tsay and Agarwal (2000) and Pekgun et al. (2006). However, firms in all these
studies compete for a single product, and hence product substitutability is not an
issue. Modelling two competing firms each of which sells a menu of substitutable
products (as is the case for FedEx and UPS) is another possible extension of our
work, and is the focus of our study in the next chapter. In the following chapter, we
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answer the same research questions about the effects of a firm’s capacity strategy
on its product differentiation, but in a competitive setting, where the demand from
a given customer segment is not only influenced by the service offered to other
segments but also by what is offered by other competing firms.
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Chapter 4
Competitive Market: Models &
Solutions
4.1 Introduction
In chapters 2 and 3, we studied the effects of a firm’s operations strategy, specifi-
cally sharing versus dedicating service capacities to different market segments, and
product substitution on its price and delivery time differentiation strategy. Our
study provided us with some useful insights. We found that sharing capacity re-
sults in a larger price differentiation between the different market segments and
also a larger delivery time differentiation if the capacity cost is high. So, if FedEx,
which uses dedicated capacities for different market segments, ever decides to pool
its resources, it should make the two prices more different. However, the decision
to make the delivery time more different or more similar will depend on its capacity
cost. Further, we showed that product substitution always reduces price differenti-
ation even if it makes the services more homogeneous in terms of their guaranteed
delivery times. This has an important implication for Dell, used as an example in
our earlier discussion that makes customized offers to a given customer segment,
which are not available to other customer segments. If Dell decides to make a
segment-specific offer available to the other segment as well, it should decrease the
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difference in the prices charged to the two segments. Although these are important
managerial insights, they are based on the assumption that a firm makes these de-
cisions in isolation, and the presence of other firms in the industry has no bearing
on its price and delivery time decisions. In the FedEx versus UPS example, this
is tantamount to saying that FedEx makes its price, delivery time and capacity
decisions independent of the corresponding decisions by UPS, and vice-versa. That
is to say, each firm operates as a monopolist.
Businesses in real world, however, rarely operate as monopolists. FedEx, for
example, faces competition form UPS, DHL and others. Similarly, Dell competes
with Hewlett Packard, IBM, Acer and others for its market share in the PC indus-
try. In face of competition, firms make their decisions keeping in mind reactions
from other firms. For example, in 2002, Sony announced to cut the price of its
PlayStation 2 game console from $299 to $199. Micrsoft, in response, marked down
the price of its Xbox console the very next day, which was followed by a similar
price cut by Nintendo for its GameCube platform from $149 to $50 (Rudy 2002).
Similary, Wal-Mart trumped price cuts by Netflix and Blockbuster by slashing the
price of its standard DVD rentals-by-mail plan by 7.5% (Borland and Hansen 2004).
UPS launched a new service that guarantees next day mail delivery by 8:30 a.m. in
response to FedEX’s “next day mail delivery by 11:00 a.m.” (So and Song 1998).
Other examples of price and/or lead-time competition can be found in Pekgun et
al. (2006).
We know competition, in general, drives prices down. In the specific exam-
ples cited above, Sony, Microsoft, Nintendo, Wal-Mart, Netflix and Blockbuster all
decided to cut their prices to compete with each other. However, whether competi-
tion increases or decreases price differentiation (price discrimination, as is popularly
termed in Economics literature) is not clear, all the more so when the price discrim-
ination is based on some endogenous category such as the delivery time guarantee
(second degree discrimination (Talluri and Van Ryzin 2004)).
The textbook theory argues that competitive firms cannot price discriminate
81
since they are price takers, while monopolists can price discriminate to the extent
that there exists both homogeneity in consumers’ demand elasticities and a useful
sorting mechanism to distinguish between consumer types (Gerardi and Shapiro
2007). The textbook theory, therefore, predicts that competition should decrease
price discrimination. This is further corroborated by the theoretical model of Ro-
chet and Stole (2002) on second degree price discrimination. However, the theoret-
ical models of Gale (1993) and Stole (1995) produce exactly the opposite results.
As there is no overarching theoretical model, the relation between competition and
price discrimination becomes an empirical question. However, different empirical
studies have again produced very contrasting results. Borenstein (1989) and Boren-
stein and Rose (1994) found evidence of increasing price dispersion with competition
in airline industry, thereby suggesting that competition increases price discrimina-
tion. However, a more detailed empirical study by Gerardi and Shapiro (2007)
found a negative relation between market competition price dispersion, thereby
suggesting that competition decreases price discrimination. Further, a more com-
plex analysis is necessary when the firm must price discriminate on the basis of some
endogenous category such as the delivery time preference (Varian 1989). Moreover,
the effect of competition on delivery time differentiation between different customer
segments itself is not clear.
We now extend the model for price and delivery time decisions, developed in
chapter 2, to a competitive setting in which a firm’s decisions are influenced by
other firms in the industry. Our primary objective is to investigate if the managerial
insights generated in the previous chapter for a monopolistic setting hold true, in
general, for a competitive setting. Through our study, we try to shed more light
into the effect of market competition, and also of firms capacity strategies, on price
and delivery time differentiation/discrimination. Specifically, we try to address the
following:
• How does the operation strategy (dedicated or shared capacity) of a firm
affect its price and delivery time decisions for its substitutable products, and
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hence its product differentiation strategy, in presence of competition from
other firms in the industry?
• How does asymmetry in firms’ operating conditions (in terms of capacity
settings or cost parameters) affect the equilibrium prices and delivery times?
• How does competition affect the price and delivery time differentiation deci-
sions of a firm relative to a monopolistic setting?
To explore the impact of a firm’s operations strategy (dedicated versus shared
capacity), we compare the following three scenarios given in Table 4.1:
Table 4.1: Different capacity scenarios in a competitive market
Scenario Capacity Setting




Comparisons among the three scenarios brings out the effect of a firm’s operations
strategy on its price and delivery time differentiation in a competitive market.
Comparing the results of a competitive market with those of a monopolistic market
further brings out the effect of market competition.
Rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In §4.2, we provide a review of
the related literature. We present our mathematical model and the underlying
assumptions in §4.3. In §4.4, we describe the best response of a firm, given its
competitor’s price and delivery time decisions, for both the dedicated and shared
capacity settings. Equilibrium solution for the duopoly problem is presented in
§4.5. Discussion of results is deferred to chapter 5.
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4.2 Literature Review
Literature on price and/or time competition can mostly be classified into (Cachon
and Harker 2002) (i) papers on inventory games, and (ii) those on queueing games.
Papers on inventory games are relevant in a make-to-stock setting where firms
use inventory as their strategic tool to compete in the market. Parlar (1988), Li
(1992), Ha et al. (2003), Dai (2003), Bernstein and Federgruen (2003), Bernstein
and Federgruen (2004) are some of the papers that fall in this category. Papers on
queueing games are pertinent to make-to-order or service industries, where firms
use better (server) capacity/queue management to adjust their price and delivery
time decisions, and thus compete in the market. Since our model is relevant to
make-to-order or service industries, our focus is on the latter category.
One of the first papers on queueing games is by Levhari and Luski (1978), who
consider two competing firms providing identical service to customers and having
identical service time distribution. However, customers are heterogenous in their
sensitivity to waiting times, which is captured using different costs that they attach
to their delay in service. Customers decide whether or not to seek service from one
of these firms. It is shown that at equilibrium, the firms charge different prices in
general, and that the firm charging higher price specializes in serving more time
sensitive customers. Kalai et al. (1992) consider competition between two firms
with service speed as a strategic tool to capture a larger market share, but pricing
is not a decision variable.
Literature on queueing games can further be categorized into (i) papers that
aggregate price and waiting time cost into a single measure called “full price”, and
(ii) those that model price and delivery/waiting time as independent explanatory
variables. Levhari and Luski (1978), Loch (1991), Lederer and Li (1997), Chen and
Wan (2003) and Armony and Haviv (2003) belong to the former category. All these
papers assume that customers associate a specific cost rate with their waiting time,
and that they make their selection of a firm based only on their “full price”, which
is the sum of the actual price charged and the expected delay cost, disregarding any
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other service attributes. Further, they assume that all customers are in a position
to assess the equilibrium steady state waiting times they will experience.
Chen and Wen (2003) study a duopoly market with two service providers, each
modelled as an M/M/1 server, that compete for a single customer class on the basis
of full price, but charge the same full price in the long run. Loch (1991) considers
a duopoly market with service providers operating as M/G/1 servers with given
service rates, and two customer classes, each with a given waiting cost rate and
average service time. A customer selects the firm that offers the lowest full price.
The author shows the existence of a Nash Equilibrium in which the customers
are prioritized according to the “cµ rule” (see Mendelson and Whang 1990 for a
discussion of the “cµ rule”). The author shows that the game has a unique pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium when the two firms are symmetric, i.e., have the same
service rates. However, pure-strategy equilibrium may not exist when the firms are
asymmetric.
Armony and Haviv (2003) study a similar duopoly problem with two customer
classes with each firm modelled as an M/M/1 server. Competition is modelled in
two stages. In the first stage, firms compete on the basis of their prices. In the
second stage, given the prices, the two customer classes decide whether or not to
seek service or how to allocate their demand between the two firms.
Lederer and Li (1997) consider a more generalized model with an arbitrary
number of competing firms, each modelled as an M/G/1 server, and an arbitrary
number of customer classes. Firms compete in the market by selecting their prices,
production rates and scheduling policies. The authors establish the existence of a
Nash Equilibrium in which customers are prioritized according to the “cµ rule”.
The second category of papers, which model price and delivery time as inde-
pendent explanatory variables, include So (2000), Pekgun et al. (2006), Allon and
Federgruen (2007, 2008). These papers model customers’ aggregate demand for a
firm’s service as a function of its price, delivery time and/or other service attributes,
each of which is explicitly advertised by the firm. So (2000) uses a multiplicative
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competitive interaction (MCI) model to represent the market shares of an arbitrary
number of firms competing for the same product based on their prices and delivery
time guarantees. Each firm is modelled as an M/M/1 server, which targets to meet
its promised delivery time guarantee with at least a certain degree of reliability.
The author shows how heterogeneous firms exploit their competitive advantage, in
terms of a higher capacity or a lower operating cost, to differentiate their services.
Pekgun et al. (2006) study two firms competing in a common market based on
their price and lead-time decisions, and explore the impact of centralization versus
decentralization of these decisions, as quoted by the marketing and production
departments, respectively. They model the competing firms as M/M/1 servers,
and each firm’s expected demand as a linear function of the prices and delivery
times quoted by both the firms.
Allon and Federgruen (2007) study competition between an arbitrary number
of firms, each modelled as an M/M/1 server, for a class of homogeneous customers.
They model the expected demand for each firm as a separable function of all firms’
prices and service levels, which is also linear in the prices. The service level is defined
as the difference between an upper bound benchmark for waiting time and the firm’s
actual waiting time standard. They study three types of competition depending on
the order in which the decision variables are selected: (i) service-level first, (ii) price
first, and (iii) simultaneous game. Allon and Federgruen (2008) further extend this
to a setting with multiple customer classes, all served by shared service facilities.
Each firm competes by advertising its price and expected waiting time, and selects
its optimal capacity level and a priority discipline to serve the customers. Their
demand model is separable by customer class, i.e., the demand rate for a firm from a
given customer class is independent of the prices and waiting time standards offered
to other customer classes. They study the equilibrium behavior of the firms under
three types of competition: (i) price competition, (ii) waiting time competition,
and (iii) simultaneous competition.
It is worth mentioning the work of Tsay and Agrawal (2000) whose demand
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model, although in a deterministic setting, bears some similarity with Pekgun et
al. (2006) and Allon and Federgruen (2007). They study a distribution system
in a non-queueing framework in which a manufacturer supplies a common product
to two retailers, who compete for end customers based on their retail prices and
service.
There is another line of research on duopolies in price and time sensitive markets,
where customers strategically choose the firm that maximizes their utility, which is
generally a function of their price and other service attributes. Besbes and Zeevi
(2005) model utility as a function of price and waiting time. Ho and Zheng (2004)
model customers’ utility as a function of their expected delivery time and service
quality, whereas Li and Lee (1994) model it as a function of price, response time and
quality. It is possible to derive an aggregate demand function from the underlying
utility model (see Anderson et al. 1992, Farahat and Perakis 2008 Liu et al. 2007).
We position our work in the second category since we treat price and delivery
times as independent variables announced by a firm. Although our demand model
bears some similarity with those used by Tsay and Agrawal (2002), Pekgun et al.
(2006) and Allon and Federgruen (2007), it is fundamentally different from them in
that these models consider only a single customer class, and thus there is no market
segmentation. To our knowledge, Loch (1991), Lederer and Li (1997), Armony and
Haviv (2003) and Allon and Federgruen (2008) are the only works to have addressed
the phenomenon of market segmentation. As noted earlier, these papers, except
for Allon and Federgruen (2008), assume that customers aggregate the price and
delivery time into a full price, and that they select the service provider on the
basis of this full price only. In doing so, they assume that all customers are in a
position to assess the equilibrium steady state waiting times they will experience,
while in our model, waiting time standards are advertised to the different classes.
Moreover, they consider the firms’ capacity levels as exogenously given, and not
a decision variable. Thus, Allon and Federgruen (2008) appears to be the closest
to our work. However, they study completely segmented markets, which means
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that each customer is strictly assigned to a specific class, and she cannot switch
between different classes. This is tantamount to saying that the specific service
package (price and delivery time combination) offered to a given customer class is
not available to any other class, and hence is non-substitutable. Our demand model
is more generalized, which also captures product substitution. Moreover, Allon and
Federgruen (2008) use a service level that is based on expected delivery times. In
other words, they assume that firms select their capacity levels so that customers
from each segment are served within their promised delivery times on average. As




We consider a service or a make-to-order manufacturing industry with two firms,
indexed by i ∈ {1, 2} and j = 3 − i, competing in a market that is segmented
into 2 customer classes, indexed by k ∈ {h, l}. As described in chapter 2, class
h customers are high priority/express customers who are more time sensitive and
are willing to pay a price premium for a shorter delivery time. Class l customers
are low priority/regular customers who are more price sensitive and are willing to
accept a longer delivery time for a price discount. Firm i competes for its market
share by selecting its prices pik and guaranteed delivery times L
i
k offered to market
segment k ∈ {h, l}. Firm i faces a demand from class k, generated according to




k, k ∈ {h, l}, i ∈ {1, 2}), which depends on the
decisions of both firms in the following way: each firm’s expected demand from a
given market segment is (i) decreasing in its price and delivery time offered to that
segment, (ii) increasing in its price and delivery time offered to the other market
segment, and (iii) increasing in the price and delivery time offered offered by the
























2ai : market base of firm i
βkp : sensitivity of class k demand to its own price
βkL : sensitivity of class k demand to its own guaranteed delivery time
θp : sensitivity of demand to inter-class price difference
θL : sensitivity of demand to inter-class delivery time difference
γp : sensitivity of demand to inter-firm price difference
γL : sensitivity of demand to inter-firm delivery time difference
2ai parameterizes firm i′s market base. Mathematically, it is the demand faced by
firm i when price and delivery time offered by each firm to each customer class is
zero. It captures the aggregate effect of all the factors such as a firm’s brand image,
service quality, etc other than price and delivery time on demand. Hence, the firm
offering the lowest price and the shortest delivery time to a market segment need
not capture its entire demand. The relative values of ai and aj can be loosely used
to describe comparative advantage in terms of a firm’s market penetration. This
may reflect the underlying preferences of customers for one firm over the other,
which may be due to customers’ appeal for a brand.
The behavior of the market depends on the relative sensitivities of customers
to prices and delivery times, described through various market parameters. Two
specific combinations of these parameters are of special interest, as we will see in our
analysis in the next chapter. These combinations define specific market behavior,
which are extensions of their counterparts described for the monopolistic setting in
chapters 2 and 3.
• Time Difference Sensitive (TDS): We say the market is TDS type when
the relative sensitivity of customers to the inter-class delivery time differ-
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ence (with respect to their own delivery time and inter-firm delivery time
difference) is greater than their relative sensitivity to the inter-class price dif-
ference (with respect to their own price and inter-firm price difference), such
that θL/(β
k
L + γL) > θp/(β
k
p + γp), k ∈ {h, l}.
• Price Difference Sensitive (PDS): We say the market is PDS type when the
relative sensitivity of customers to the inter-class price difference (with respect
to their own price and inter-firm price difference) is greater than their relative
sensitivity to the inter-class delivery times difference (with respect to their





L + γL), k ∈ {h, l}.
The above demand model ((4.1) - (4.2)) is an extension of the monopolist demand
model used in Chapters 2 and 3, and captures the cross-firm effect on a firm’s
demand. It also generalizes the demand model used by Boyaci and Ray (2003) to a
competitive setting, and those used by Tsay and Agarwal (2000) and Pekgun et al.
(2006) to segmented markets. Further, it generalizes the demand model used by
Allon and Federgruen (2008) by taking into account product substitution (θp and






k) in our model is invariant to any
changes in inter-firm or inter-class sensitivities, which only affects the distribution of
the total demand among the firms and the customer classes. However, the pricing
and delivery time decisions of the two firms affect both the total market size as
well as the resulting demand for each firm and from each market segment. This
is in sharp contrast to the multiplicative competitive interaction model used by So
(2000), which assumes the total market size to be constant. We make the following
assumptions regarding the market parameters:
Assumption 4.1. βkp > 0, β
k




This is to ensure that demand from a market segment is decreasing in its own price
and delivery time; increasing in price and delivery time offered by the same firm to
90
the other segment; and increasing in price and delivery time offered by the other






L are required by definition of the
two customer classes. θp > 0, θL > 0 signifies product substitution, while γp > 0,
γL > 0 signify the presence of price competition and delivery time competition in
the market. γp = γL = 0 makes the demand of two firms independent, and hence
decouples their decision making, resulting in a monopolistic setting.
Assumption 4.2. The market base ai is sufficiently large.
This assumption is similar to Assumption 2.2 of chapter 2, and is required, as we
will see in §4.4, to ensure that firm i′s best response always consists of non-negative
prices and demands and a smaller delivery time to express customers compared to
that offered to regular customers, i.e., Lih < L
i
l.
It is important to note that our demand model does not explicitly consider the
impact of the reliability of delivery time guarantees. Firms that constantly miss on
their promised delivery time will eventually lose their credibility with customers for
future business, which defeats the very purpose of exploiting delivery time guaran-
tees to attract customers. In fact, in the airline industry, independent government
agencies (e.g., the Aviation Consumer Protection Division of the DOT) and In-
ternet travel services (e.g., Expedia) report, on a flight-by-flight basis, the average
delay and percentage of flights arriving within 15 minutes of their schedule (Allon
and Federgruen 2007). Indeed, firms target to meet their guaranteed delivery times
with at least a given level of reliability, and carefully monitor their delivery per-
formance. To take this into consideration in our model, we use a reliability level
αi with which firm i tries to meet its delivery time guarantee. In our model, we
restrict our discussions only to cases where the service reliability for each firm is the
same, i.e., αi = α. This is applicable in situations where there exists some industry
standard and published reports (like those published by the Aviation Consumer
Protection Division of the DOT and Expedia for airline industry) such that the de-
livery performance of each firm is readily available to customers. In this way, firms
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Figure 4.1: Schematic representation of a competitive model
then mainly affected by their promised times and prices, as depicted by our demand
model. Of course, our model and analysis also allow for different service reliabilities
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for different firms.
We assume the time firm i takes to serve a customer from class k is exponentially
distributed with a rate µik. Firm i, therefore, behaves like an M/M/· queuing
system. Further, it serves its customers within a given class on a first-come-first-
serve (FCFS) basis. We assume firm i incurs the same operating cost of $mi and a
marginal capacity cost of $Ai in serving a customer of either class.
The industry is assumed to have established a standard delivery time for regular
customers, and hence Lil = L
j
l = Ll. Firm i selects and announces its express




l) so as to maximize its profit. Firm





by firm j = 3 − i since they have an impact on firm i′s demands, and hence
on its profit. It also needs to simultaneously select its optimal service rates (i.e.,
installed capacities) µik in order to meet the guaranteed delivery times with at least




i, j : indices for firm; i ∈ {1, 2}, and j = 3− i
k : index for customer class; k ∈ {h, l}
λik : mean demand rate for firm i from customer class k (units/unit time)
µik : mean processing rate of firm i for customer class k (units/unit time)
pik : price charged by firm i to customer class k ($/unit)
Lik : delivery time quoted by firm i to customer class k (time units)
W ik : steady state actual sojourn (waiting + service) time of customer class
k at firm i (time units)
αi : target service level set by firm i (no unit)
Sik(L
i
k) : actual service level achieved by firm i for quoted delivery time L
i
k, i.e.,
P(W ik ≤ Lik) (no unit)
mi : unit operating cost of firm i ($/unit)
Ai : marginal capacity cost of firm i ($/unit)
In the next section, we describe the best response of a firm, given its competitor’s
price, delivery time and capacity decisions.
4.4 The Best Response of a Firm








l ) of firm
j = 3 − i, firm i ∈ {1, 2} selects its own corresponding decisions (pih, pil, Lih, µih, µil)
that maximize its profit and also ensure that its delivery time commitments are
met reliably. As clear from the demand model ((4.1) - (4.2)), the demands for firm
i ∈ {1, 2}, and its decisions in turn, depend on the price and delivery time decisions
made by firm j = 3− i. Firm i′s demand and its decisions, however, do not depend
on the capacity level (µjh, µ
j
l ) selected by firm j. While competing with the other
firm, each firm, therefore, possesses only two types of essential strategic instruments:
prices and the delivery times. Firm i′s strategy can be defined as a vector of its




h), which it uses to compete against the
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h ) such that π
i(si∗, sj) = maxsi π
i(si, sj), i ∈ {1, 2}
































h) = P (W
i
h ≤ Lih) ≥ α (4.7)
Sil (L
i
l) = P (W
i
l ≤ Lil) ≥ α (4.8)
We call it the Pricing and Delivery Time Decision Problem for firm i (PDTDP i).
As noted in chapter 2, in certain situations delivery times may be relatively sticky.
In such situations, firms use prices as the only strategic variables for competition.
Firm i′s best response is then obtained by solving PDTDP i for fixed Lih and
Lil. We call the resulting problem a Pricing Decision Problem, denoted by PDP
i.
Notice that a firm’s best response problem has a form very much similar to a
firm’s optimal decision problem in a monopolistic setting, described in chapter 2.
Difference still arises between the two due to a different demand model for a firm
in a competitive setting, which also takes into account the effect of the price and
delivery time decisions of its competitor. Therefore, the best response of a firm
can also be solved using similar solution methods as developed in chapter 2. We,
therefore, keep our discussion of the solution method very brief, citing important
results, which are later used to obtain the equilibrium decisions of competing firms.
PDTDP i is a generalized model of a firm’s best response, irrespective of its
capacity strategy. In what follows, we develop the specialized model of PDTDP i
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for firm i using dedicated or shared capacities by specifying the exact form of
constraints (4.6)-(4.8), and discuss the solution method for each.
4.4.1 Dedicated Capacity Setting
As discussed in chapter 2, for a dedicated capacity setting, where each customer
class is served by a separate M/M/1 server, the tail of the sojourn time distribution
for either class of customers is known to be exponential. In this case, there is a
separate stability condition for each of the queues. Hence, constraints (4.6), (4.7)
and (4.8) can be expressed as:
λik − µik < 0, k ∈ {h, l} (4.6DC)
Sih(L
i
h) = P (W
i






h ≥ α (4.7DC)
Sil (L
i
l) = P (W
i






l ≥ α (4.8DC)
We denote the resulting Pricing and Delivery Time Decision Problem for firm i in
a dedicated capacity setting by PDTDP iDC .
Proposition 4.1. In a dedicated capacity setting, both the delivery time reliability
constraints (4.7DC) and (4.8DC) are binding at optimality.





+ λik k ∈ {l, h}
The profit function πi is decreasing in µik. Therefore, to maximize profit, the two
service rates should be at their minimum level that guarantees the desired service
level α. This implies that at optimality, the two delivery time reliability constraints




+ λik, k ∈ {h, l}
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Proposition 4.1 suggests that it is optimal for firms to stick to their minimum de-
livery time reliability (α) since a better service level to customers comes at an extra
cost to the firm. As a result of proposition 4.1, PDTDP iDC reduces to maximizing
(4.3) with µi as given above. The stability conditions (4.6
DC) are automatically sat-





























Proposition 4.2. For a fixed Lih, the objective function (4.9) of PDTDP
i′
DC is
strictly concave in pih and p
i
l.
Proof. The Hessian for (4.9), for a fixed Lih, is given by:
 −2(βhp + θp + γp) 2θp
2θp −2(βlp + θp + γp)

Clearly, the first order leading principal minor of the Hessian is negative, while its
determinant is positive. This proves that the objective function (4.9) in PDTDP i
′
DC
is strictly concave for a fixed Lih.
Proposition 4.2 suggests that, for a fixed Lih, PDTDP
i′
DC has a unique maxi-
mum, which can be obtained using functional optimization of its objective function






l are non-negative. Proposition 4.3 gives the best
response prices of firm i in a dedicated capacity setting to a given strategy used by
firm j.
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Proposition 4.3. If firm i operates in a dedicated capacity setting, then for a given




h) by firm j = 3−i, the best response si∗ := (pi∗h (Lih), pi∗l (Lih))




(βlp + 2θp + γp)a
i − {βlp(θL + γL) + βhL(βlp + θp + γp) + θpγL + γLγp + θLγp}Lih
2D



















(βhp + 2θp + γp)a
i − {βhp (θL + γL) + βlL(βhp + θp + γp) + θpγL + γLγp + θLγp}Lil
2D






























p γp + β
l
pγp + 2θpγp + γ
2
p .
Proof. pi∗h (Lh) and p
i∗












l, solving the above system
of equations gives a unique pair of prices that maximizes πi(Lih).
The corresponding optimal price differentiation is then:
pi∗h (L
i
h)− pi∗l (Lih) =
{(βlp − βhp )ai + (βhp + βlp)θL + (γL + 2θL)γp}(Lil − Lih)
2D


















Example 4.1: Assume the customer specific and firm specific parameter values
as shown in Table 4.2. Given firm 1′s strategy s1:= (p1h = 10, p
1
l = 8, L
1
h = 0.5),
firm 2′s best response prices and other related variables for L2h = 0.5 are given in
Table 4.3.







L θL γp γL a
2 m2 A2 α Ll
0.5 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.4 10 3 1 0.99 1













9.0894 8.0405 14.2103 8.6302 5.0 4.025 27.8944
(4.10) and (4.11) in proposition 4.3 suggest that in pricing its product for a given
customer segment, a firm should take into account the price quoted by the other firm
not only to the same customer segment but also to the other customer segment.
This, at first thought, sounds surprising. This is because our demand functions
(4.1) and (4.2) suggest that a firm’s demand from a given segment is not influenced
by what is offered to the other segment by the other firm. To make things clear,
our demand function (4.1), for example, suggests that the demand faced by firm
1 from the express segment depends on the price charged by firm 2 to the express
segment, but is not influenced by what firm 2 charges to the regular customers.
However, (4.10) suggests that in pricing its product for express customers, firm 1
should keep in mind not only the price charged by firm 2 to the express customers
but also the price charged by firm 2 to the regular customers. This is because firm
2′s price to regular customers influences its demand from express customers as well.
So, in pricing its product for express customers, firm 1 should take into account the
other factors that influence express customers’ decision, which includes the price
charged by firm 2 to regular customers.
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Proposition 4.4. If firm i operates in a dedicated capacity setting, then for a given




h) by firm j = 3− i, the best response express delivery time



























h) are given by (4.10) and (4.11).
Proof. Substituting the optimal prices, given by 4.3, into the objective function,






























Let us understand the nature of the profit function πi(Lih) as we vary L
i
h. Since
Lih ∈ [0, Ll), we are interested in its behavior only for non-negative values of Lh.
Note the similarity of (4.13), (4.14) and (4.15) to the corresponding expressions
(2.13), (2.14) and (2.15) in chapter 2. Therefore, we expect the profit function
π(Lih) to hold similar properties.
Property 4.1. As Lih → 0+, πi(Lih) → −∞.
Property 4.2. πi(Lih) is increasing concave in L
i




Property 4.3. As Lih increases from 0, π
i(Lih) changes from concave to convex for
some Lih ∈ (0, +∞), and never becomes concave again.
Using properties 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, the nature of πi(Lih) in [0, +∞) can be summarized
as shown as in Figure 4.2.
It is clear from the behavior of πi(Lih), as shown in Figure 4.2, that it has a
unique maximum and at most one minimum in [0, +∞). The stationary points are














Figure 4.2: Behavior of the profit function for Lih ∈ [0, +∞)
one root in the interval [0, Ll), and that it is the point of maximum. The condition
simplifies to:
K1a
i + K2Lil + K3A
i + K4mi











γp, γL), and hence are constants. Further,
K1 = −
{
(βlp − βhp )θL + (βhL + γL)(βlp + 2θp + γp)
}
Since βhp < β
l
p (Assumption 4.1), a necessary condition for (4.16) to hold is a
i to






Proposition 4.4 gives the best response express delivery time Li∗h in a dedicated
setting. Li∗h , like L
∗
h for the monopolistic market in chapter 2, does not have a
closed-form analytical solution. However, it can be obtained numerically using a
simple bisection method since πi(Lih) is unimodal in [0, Ll). The best response




Example 4.2: Consider again the customer specific and firm specific parameter
values as shown in Table 4.2. Given firm 1′s strategy s1:= (p1h = 10, p
1
l = 8,
L1h = 0.5), firm 2




h ) and other related
variables are shown in Table 4.4.















0.8452 8.8908 7.9990 10.2073 8.6474 4.7584 4.0423 29.3833
4.4.2 Shared Capacity Setting
The firm’s choice of shared capacity is modelled using a single server, which serves
both customer classes employing a simple fixed priority scheme that always gives
priority to time-sensitive customers. As discussed in chapter 2, for a shared setting
the delivery time reliability constraint (4.7) has an analytical closed-form repre-
sentation, similar to that for the dedicated capacity setting. However, a closed
form expression for the sojourn time distribution Sl(·) for low priority customers,
appearing in (4.8), is not known. We assume the single server serves customers of
either class at the same rate µih = µ
i
l = µ
i. Constraints (4.6) and (4.7) in a shared
capacity setting can then be expressed as:
λih + λ
i
l − µi < 0 (4.6SC)
Sih(L
i
h) = P (W
i
h ≤ Lih) = 1− e(λ
i
h−µ
i)Lih ≥ α (4.7SC)
In absence of a closed-form analytical expression for (4.8) in a shared capacity

















≥ α ∀k ∈ K
(4.17)
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where Sikl (·) denotes the value of Sil (·) at a fixed point (pikh , pikl , µik), which can















be obtaned using the finite difference method described in §2.4.2. Thus, for a given




h), of firm j, firm i
′s best response prices (pi∗h , p
i∗
l ) for a








πi = −(βhp + θp + γp)(pih)2 − (βlp + θp + γp)(pil)2 + 2θppihpil
+
{




l ) + γpp
j
h + m













i(βlp + γp) + a
}
pl −Aiµ






i − γL(Ljh + L
j
l )m
i − γp(pjh + p
j
l )
i − 2miai (4.18)
subject to:
− (βhp + θp + γp)pih + θppil − µi
≤ ln(1− α)
Lih
































µik ∀k ∈ K (4.20)
− (βhp + γp)pih − (βlp + γp)pil − µi

































i ≥ 0 (4.24)
The best response prices of firm i to a given strategy of firm j can thus be obtained
by solving PDP i(K) using the cutting plane algorithm described in 2.4.2.
Example 4.3: Consider the same problem setting as described in Example 4.1.
Assume now firm 2 uses shared capacities. Firm 2′s best response response prices
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and other related variables for Lh = 0.5 are shown in Table 4.5.










9.3545 7.8915 16.5226 4.5958 4.3545 33.9814
In chapter 2, we argued that when a firm’s express delivery time is sufficiently
small, its capacity requirement in a shared capacity setting is dictated solely by the
demand from express customers. Using a similar argument, when Lih is small, we
have:
µi = λih −
ln(1− α)
Lih
Substituting the expression for µi in the objective function, pi∗h (Lh) and p
i∗
l (Lh) can
be obtained by solving simultaneously ∂πi/∂pih = 0 and ∂π
i/∂pil = 0, in very much
the same way as we did for the dedicated case.
Observation 4.1. When Lih is small, the best response prices of firm i ∈ {1, 2} in









(βlp + 2θp + γp)a
i − {βlp(θL + γL) + βhL(βlp + θp + γp) + θpγL + γLγp + θLγp}Lih
2D



















(βhp + 2θp + γp)a
i − {βhp (θL + γL) + βlL(βhp + θp + γp) + θpγL + γLγp + θLγp}Lil
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p γp + β
l




When the prices are described by the above relations (4.25) and (4.26), it can
be shown that a small Lih will, in fact, result in a relatively large express demand
compared to regular demand for firm i. Using (4.25) and (4.26), we obtain:
dλih
dLih






− (βhL + θL + γL)
= −β
h
















This suggests that when Lih gets sufficiently small, λ
i
h gets much larger compared
to λil. Thus, the capacity requirement µ
i is dictated only by the demand from
express customers, something we used to arrive at the results (4.25) and (4.26) at
first place.




where f(Lih) is a PDP
i
(K) for a given L
i





l ) of firm j. The best response L
i
h can be obtained using the golden
section search method as we did for the monopolistic setting in chapter 2.
Example 4.4: The best response delivery time L2∗h and the corresponding prices
(p2∗h , p
2∗
l ) of firm 2 for the same problem described in Example 4.3 are given in
Table 4.6.










0.3827 9.3371 7.8661 16.8042 4.7723 4.3740 34.7228
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Observation 4.2. When the capacity cost Ai of firm i is small, its best response
express delivery time Li∗h in a shared capacity setting is given by the unique root of






















where, pi∗h (Lh) and p
i∗
l (Lh) are given by (4.25) and (4.26).
















given by (4.25) and (4.26), in the profit function πi, and differentiating it with








by the same relations (4.14) and (4.15) as for the dedicated capacity case. Thus,
the properties 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 of πi hold true in a shared capacity case as well.
This implies that for ai sufficiently high, πi has a unique maximum, as shown in
Figure 4.2, given by the root of (4.27).
We obtain the above result assuming that Lih is known to be small. We now











































This implies that Li∗h is increasing in A
i. Therefore, a small Ai guarantees that Li∗h
is small, which we used at first place to arrive at the result.
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4.5 Duopoly Problem
We now study the price and delivery time decisions for a duopoly problem. One
basic question is to investigate whether an equilibrium exists, and if so, how will
the equilibrium change under different operational settings and market character-
istics. To study the impact of a firm’s operations strategy (dedicated versus shared
capacity), we study and compare the three scenarios shown in Table 4.1. The
optimization problem that each firm solves for its best response in each of these
scenarios is given in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Mathematical models for a firm’s best response in different capacity
scenarios
Scenario Capacity Setting
Firm 1 Firm 2
DD PDTDP 1DC PDTDP
2
DC
SS PDTDP 1SC PDTDP
2
SC
DS PDTDP 1DC PDTDP
2
SC
Under competition, both firms simultaneously announce their price and delivery
time decisions. We assume that firm i ∈ {1, 2} has full knowledge of the operational
setting of firm j = 3− i, including its capacity strategy and also its parameters A,
m and a. Firm i can thus correctly anticipate the best response of firm j to its own
moves, and can hence strategically plan its own strategy. Equilibrium is reached
when none of the firms can do better by unilaterally deviating from its decisions.
A Nash equilibrium is thus a vector of strategies (si∗, sj∗) such that for each firm i,
πi(si∗, sj∗) = maxsi π
i(si, sj∗), i ∈ {1, 2} and j = 3− i. In other words, the strategy
used by either firm is the best response to the strategy chosen by the other.
The equilibrium solution can be obtained by the simultaneous solution of the
best responses for firms i = 1, 2. Proposition 4.3 gives the best response prices of a
firm using dedicated capacities. Thus, when the delivery time decisions are fixed,
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such that firms compete purely using prices, equilibrium prices in a DD setting can
be obtained in closed-form by the simultaneous solution of the 4 linear equations
given by (4.10) and (4.11) (2 equations corresponding to each i ∈ {1, 2}). Since
the equilibrium prices in a DD setting have closed-form solution, we first study the
DD setting in a greater detail.
4.5.1 Competition in a DD Setting
We first study the Equilibrium results under pure price competition wherein the
firms face a significantly higher stickiness for their delivery time decisions compared
to their ability to vary prices. Situations in which such a model will be more relevant
are discussed in chapter 2. In such situations, firms compete using only prices as
their strategic variables, treating their delivery times as fixed.
Pure Price Competition
Proposition 4.5. Pure price competition in a DD setting always results in a unique
equilibrium. Further, if the firms are identical, then the equilibrium prices are
symmetric, given by:
p∗h(Lh) =
(2βlp + 4θp + γp)a− {βhL(2βlp + 2θp + γp) + (2βlp + γp)θL}Lh
D1






p θp + β
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(2βhp + 4θp + γp)a + {(2βhp + γp)θL − 2βhLθp}Lh
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Proof. The equilibrium prices in a DD setting are given by the simultaneous solution
of the 4 linear equations given by (4.10) and (4.11) for i ∈ {1, 2}. The system of
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and b is a 4x1 matrix of constants. A is symmetric and strictly diagonally dominant
since we have Aij = Aji ∀i, j and
∑
j 6=i |Aij| < Aii ∀i. Hence, A is symmetric
positive definite (Horn and Johnson 1985). This implies that A is full-rank, and
hence the system of linear equations Ax = b has a unique solution. This proves
the uniqueness of the equilibrium.
Further, when the firms are identical, they have the same operating parame-












l (Lh)). Assume the contrary that the equilibrium solution is not sym-
metric, i.e., s1∗(Lh) 6= s2∗(Lh). Since the two firms are identical, this implies that
(s2∗, s1∗) must also be a Nash Equilibrium, which contradicts the uniqueness of the
Nash Equilibrium. Hence, s1∗(Lh) = s
2∗(Lh). Substituting p
1∗





l (Lh) = p
2∗
l (Lh) = p
∗
l (Lh) in the expressions for the best response
prices, given by (4.10) and (4.11), and solving the resulting system of 2 equations
in 2 unknown gives (4.28) and (4.29).
The corresponding price differentiation for a given Lh is then:
p∗h(Lh)− p∗l (Lh) =
2(βlp − βhp )a + 2(βlp + βhp + γp)θL(Ll − Lh) + βlL(2βhp + γp)Ll
D1




Example 4.5: Assume the customer specific and firm specific parameter values
as shown in Table 4.8. The equilibrium prices for L1h = L
2
h = 0.50 in a DD scenario
are shown in Table 4.9.







L θL γp γL
0.55 0.75 0.15 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4
a1 m1 A1 a2 m2 A2 α Ll
10 3 0.01 10 3 0.01 0.99 1
Table 4.9: Results for Example 4.5








8.166499 6.800659 8.166499 6.800659
Price and Delivery Time Competition
We now study the equilibrium solution under both price and delivery time com-
petition. The equlibrium express delivery times in a DD setting are given by the
simultaneous solution of the system of 2 non-linear equations, given by (4.13) =
0 for i = 1, 2. In absence of a closed-form solution for this system of non-linear
equations, we design an iterative procedure, described in Figure 4.3, that always
converges to the equilibrium solution. We solve for an equilibrium solution assum-
ing the game is played dynamically, starting at an initial solution, until none of the
firms has an incentive to deviate from its decision unilaterally.
Proposition 4.6. The iterative algorithm given in Figure 4.3 converges to a unique
Nash Equilibrium in a DD setting.
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Proof. The proof of convergence of the equilibrium delivery times is based on an
important result that for a given set of parameter values, each firm monotonically
increases or decreases its express delivery time in response to an increase in the
correspoding express delivery time by its competitor. If the two firms play the
game iteratively, any one of the following will happen:
• Both L1h and L2h increase monotonically or both L1h and L2h decrease mono-
tonically
• L1h increases monotonically and L2h decreases monotonically or vice-versa
Since the express delivery times are bounded above and below (Lih ∈ [0, Lil)), they
will converge ultimately. The equilibrium prices are then given by the unique
solution to the system of linear equations given by the best response prices of the
two firms at the equilibrium express delivery times. Details of the proof are given
in Appendix B.1.
1. Initialization: For each firm i, set pih = p
i
l = m
i, Lih = 0 or
Lih = Ll.
2. Iterative step: Start with i = 1. Use the best response obtained
for Firm i problem. Repeat this for i = 2.
3. Convergence criteria: Repeat step 2 until each firm’s decision
values differ from their previous values by less than some prede-
termined tolerance level ε.
Figure 4.3: Iterative Algorithm for Nash Equilibrium
4.5.2 Competition in an SS or a DS Setting
When one of the competing firms uses shared capacities, we do not have a closed-
form analytical characterization of its best response prices and delivery time. In
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such a situation, equlibrium prices and delivery times are obtained using the it-
erative procedure, described in Figure 4.3. Our extensive numerical experiments
confirm its convergence to a unique Nash Equilibrium in all operational settings.
Further, in a pure price competition, the equlibrium prices can be obtained using
the same iterative procedure by fixing Lih.
Observation 4.3. The iterative procedure given in Figure 4.3 always converges to
a unique Nash Equilibrium under all capacity settings.
Example 4.6: Assume the customer specific and firm specific parameter values
as shown in Table 4.8. The equilibrium result for each of the three operational
settings: (i) DD, (ii) SS and (iii) DS is shown in Table 4.10
Table 4.10: Results for Example 4.6
DD SS DS
Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2 Firm 1 Firm 2
L∗h 0.075916 0.075916 0.075927 0.075927 0.075915 0.075928
p∗h 8.487575 8.487575 8.487409 8.487409 8.48746 8.487527
p∗l 6.748059 6.748059 6.742129 6.742129 6.747257 6.742933
In the above example, we obtain a unique Nash Equilibrium for each of the
operational settings in the above example. Further, the equilibrium is symmetric
when both the firms are identical (i.e., have the same firm-specific parameters: ai,
Ai, mi, and use the same capacity strategy).
Observation 4.4. If the firms are identical, then pure price competition in an SS
setting results in symmetric equilibrium prices, which for small Lh are given by:
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p∗h(Lh) =
(2βlp + 4θp + γp)a− {βhL(2βlp + 2θp + γp) + (2βlp + γp)θL}Lh
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A mathematical justification for the above observation is given in Appendix B.2.
The corresponding price differentiation is given by:
p∗h(Lh)− p∗l (Lh) =
2(βlp − βhp )a + 2(βlp + βhp + γp)θL(Ll − Lh) + βlL(2βhp + γp)Ll
D1
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Example 4.7: Assume the same parameter values as described in Table 4.8.
Assume that the firms’ delivery time decisions are sticky such that they compete
only in their prices. Further, assume that both the firms have a small express
delivery time, L1h = L
2
h = Lh = 0.10. The equilibrium prices in an SS scenario are
shown in Table 4.11.
4.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we extended our models developed in chapter 2 for optimal product
differentiation strategy to a competitive setting. Our primary objective was to un-
derstand how the capacity strategies used by competing firms affect their price and
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Table 4.11: Results for Example 4.7








8.469186 6.745116 8.469186 6.745116
delivery time differentiation decisions, and if the qualitative results of a monopo-
listic setting also extend to a competitive setting. For this we developed a general
mathematical model, special cases of which capture three different scenarios, de-
pending on the capacity strategy used by either firm. We extended the solution
methods developed for the monopolistic setting to obtain the best response of a
firm when competing with another firm. We finally designed an iterative algorithm
to obtain the price and delivery time decisions at equilibrium of competing firms.
In the following chapter, we study the models developed in this chapter to un-
derstand how equilibrium decisions of competing firms are shaped by the capacity
strategy they choose. We also use the results of the competitive setting to investi-
gate how competition, per se, affects the product differentiation of a firm.
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Chapter 5
Competitive Market: Analysis &
Insights
In chapter 4, we extended the models developed in chapter 2 to a competitive
framework, and adapted them for the different scenarios depending on the capacity
strategy used by the competing firms. In this chapter, we study in detail the
different models developed in chapter 4. Based on our numerical study, we draw
important insights into how the capacity strategies of competing firms influence
their product differentiation strategies. In §5.1, we describe the experimental setup
for our numerical study of various scenarios. §5.2 presents some general observations
on the best response of a firm. Comparisons of equilibrium results under pure price
competition and more general price and delivery time competition are presented
in §5.3 and §5.4, respectively. We conclude the chapter with a summary of main
results and directions for future research in §5.5.
5.1 Numerical Experiment Design
Our model setting described in chapter 4 involves the following parameters: ai, mi,
Ai, α and Ll. Of these, we fix the value of Ll = 1 and α = 0.99. As regards the
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other parameters, we experiment with a large combination of their values as given
in Table 5.1:
Table 5.1: Parameter settings for numerical experiments
Parameter Number of Choices Possible Values
ai 6 {10, 15, 20, 25, 50, 100}
mi 6 {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
Ai 2X4 {0.01, 0.025, 0.05, 0.1} (small A)
{0.25, 0.50, 0.75, 1.0} (large A)
Of these (6X6X2X4)2 possible choices, we select those combinations for our exper-
iments that satisfy the condition for unique Li∗h , as given in the proof of proposition
4.4. For the market parameters, we use the following combinations:
• Time Difference Sensitive (TDS): βhp = 0.5, βlp = 0.7, βhL = 0.9, βlL = 0.7, θp =
0.2, θL = 0.5, (γp, γL) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 0.4), (0.4, 0), (0.4, 0.4), (0.1, 0.95), (0.95, 0.1)},
such that θL/(β
k
L + γL) > θp/(β
k
p + γp), k ∈ {h, l}.
• Price Difference Sensitive (PDS): βhp = 0.5, βlp = 0.7, βhL = 0.9, βlL = 0.7, θp =
0.4, θL = 0.1, (γp, γL) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 0.4), (0.4, 0), (0.4, 0.4), (0.1, 0.95), (0.95, 0.1)},
such that θp/(β
k
p + γp) > θL/(β
k
L + γL), k ∈ {h, l}.
For illustration, we use the parameter setting shown in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, unless
stated otherwise.
Table 5.2: Market parameters used in illustrative examples
Market Type ↓ βhp βlp θp βhL βlL θL γp γL
TDS 0.55 0.75 0.15 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4
PDS 0.5 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.4
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Table 5.3: Firm-specific parameters used in illustrative examples
Firm 1 Firm 2
a1 A1 m1 α1 L1l a
2 A2 m2 α2 L2l
10 0.25 3 0.99 1 10 0.25 3 0.99 1
We first make some general observations on the best response of firm i to a
given strategy of firm j under different capacity settings.
5.2 Best Response of a Firm




h) of firm j = 3− i, a decrease
in the express delivery time Lih by firm i ∈ {1, 2} results in: (a) an increase in




L + γL) > θp/(β
h





L + γL) < θp/(β
h
p + γp).
For the best response of a firm using dedicated capacities, the above observation
follows directly from Proposition 4.3. In a shared capacity setting, the above ob-
servation follows from Observation 4.1 for small Lih. Observation 5.1 suggests that
given the decisions of the other firm, a firm’s best response express price always
decreases with an increase in its express delivery time. The effect of any change
in its express delivery time on the regular price, however, depends on whether the
market is TDS (θL/(β
h
L +γL) > θp/(β
h
p +γp))or PDS (θL/(β
h
L +γL) < θp/(β
h
p +γp)).
In the remainder of this chapter, we compare the equilibrium results of compet-
ing firms under different capacity settings. We first study the Equilibrium results
under pure price competition wherein the firms face a significantly higher stickiness
for their delivery time decisions compared to their ability to vary prices.
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5.3 Pure Price Competition
5.3.1 Effect of Capacity Strategy
Observation 5.2. - Pure price competition under SS, compared to DD, results in:
(a) a larger price differentiation at equilibrium.
- Pure price competition under DS results in: (a) a larger price differentiation at
equilibrium for the firm using shared capacities compared to the other firm using
dedicated capacities.









































Figure 5.1: Price differentiation in different capacity settings under pure price com-
petition
The above observation, for small Lh, follows directly by comparing (4.31) with
(4.34). This is shown in Figure 5.1(a) for a PDS type market. Although the be-
havior of the prices of each firm may change in a different market type, the above
observation still holds true, irrespective of the market behavior. Further, comparing
(4.28) with (4.32) and (4.29) with (4.33) suggests that when two symmetric firms
compete using shared capacities, their equilibrium prices for both the market seg-
ments are smaller than when they both compete using dedicated capacities. This
suggests that all customers are better off when the competing firms use shared ca-
pacities. Note that when the two firms competing in DD or SS setting are identical,
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their prices at equilibrium are symmetric so that the differentiation at equilibrium
of both the firms coincide. Our numerical results suggest that when the two firms
compete in a DS setting, their price decisions at equilibrium are not symmetric
even if the firms are otherwise identical. The asymmetry in their equilibrium prices
results from the asymmetry in the capacity strategies. The firm using shared ca-
pacities always maintains a higher price differentiation compared to the other firm
that uses dedicated capacities as shown in Figure 5.1(b).
5.3.2 Effect of Price Competition
We have so far analyzed our models in a competitive setting to study the effects
of firms’ capacity strategies on their price differentiation strategies. We now study
the effect of price competition on a firm’s price and delivery time decisions in a
given capacity setting. We know competition generally drives prices down. But
how does competition affect price differentiation? To answer this, we compare
the optimal prices of a monopolist with its equilibrium prices when it faces price
competition from an identical firm. A monopolist setting can be represented using
the mathematical model of chapter 2 for a single firm with a market base 2a.
Alternatively, it can be represented using a competitive model of chapter 4 for two
identical firms, each with a market base 2a, but with γp = γL = 0. The later case
represents two identical firms operating in geographically different markets such
that they do not poach each other’s market share. From the firms’ point of view,
there is no difference between the two scenarios as they both result in the same
monopolist prices. In contrast, a competitive setting represents a situation in which
two firms operate in the same geographical market, each with a market base 2a,
such that each firm’s demand is affected by the relative prices of the two firms.
Mathematically, this corresponds to γp > 0, γL > 0 in our competitive model.
The way competition affects price differentiation may also be influenced by the
operations (capacity) strategy of the competing firms. However, in absence of an
analytical characterization of optimal prices when one of the firms uses shared
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capacities, we restrict our study only to a setting where the firms use dedicated
capacities. The effect of price competition is summarized in the following proposi-
tion.
Proposition 5.1. Pure price competition in a dedicated capacity setting always
results in: (a) a lower express price p∗h, (a) a lower regular price p
∗
l , and (c) a
lower price differentiation (p∗h − p∗l ). Further, the effects are more pronounced in
presence of product substitution.
Proof. See Appendix C.1
The effect of competition on individual prices is not surprising. In fact, it is
well established in theory that competition always decreases prices (Varian 1989).
This is observed in practice as well as highlighted by various real-world examples
in §4.1. However, researchers seem to be divided in their understanding of the
effect of competition on price differentiation. Our model, with an important link-
age between marketing decision of price discrimination and operation’s capacity
related decisions, provides results that concur with the traditional theory on price
discrimination that predicts that market competition decreases a firms ability to
use price discrimination. Our results are also consistent with the findings of Ger-
ardi and Shapiro (2007), which suggest that price discrimination has decreased with
increase in competition in the airline industry. Our result, however, is in contrast
with empirical results of (Borenstein and Rose (1994), which conclude otherwise
for the airline industry. Further, our results suggest that the effects of competition
on individual prices as well as price discrimination are more pronounced in pres-
ence of product substitution. This suggests that the degree of price discrimination
(second degree in presence of product substitution, and third degree in absence of
product substitution) further plays a role in deciding the intensity of the effect of
price competition.
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5.4 Price and Delivery Time Competition
We now consider a more general situation where firms have flexibility in quoting
the delivery times to their express customers. We still assume there is a standard
delivery time for regular customers established by the industry.1 In such a situa-
tion, firms compete by strategically selecting both the express delivery time and the
two prices. We first study the effect of firms’ capacity strategies on product differ-
entiation at equilibrium, and then we study the effect of competition on the firms’
decisions. Finally, we study the effect of asymmetry, in terms of firms’ operating
parameters, on their price and delivery time decisions.
5.4.1 Effect of Capacity Strategy
Observation 5.3. - Price and delivery time competition under SS, compared to
DD, results in: (a) a larger price differentiation at equilibrium, and (b) a larger
delivery time at equilibrium if capacity cost is high, but a smaller delivery time dif-
ferentiation when capacity cost is small.
- Price and delivery time competition under DS results in: (a) a larger price dif-
ferentiation at equilibrium for the firm using shared capacities, and (b) a larger
delivery time differentiation at equilibrium for the firm using shared capacities if
capacity cost is high, but a smaller delivery time differentiation for the firm using
shared capacities when capacity cost is small.
The above observation is an extension of the results obtained in chapter 3 to a
competitive setting. This observation suggests that the capacity strategies of firms
have the same influence on their product differentiation decisions in a competitive
market as they have in a monopolist setting. The first part of the observation (for
DD versus SS) can be shown analytically for the case when the capacity cost A is
1In a more general situation, firms may optimally select delivery times for both the customer
segments. However, our assumption of a standard delivery time for regular customers is made
mainly for the tractability of the model.
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Table 5.4: Numerical Results for DD and SS settings
A = 0.01 A = 0.25
PDS TDS PDS TDS
DD SS DD SS DD SS DD SS
L∗h 0.079835 0.07984 0.075916 0.075927 0.40887 0.375944 0.393785 0.382392
Ll − L∗h 0.920165 0.92016 0.924084 0.924073 0.59113 0.624056 0.606215 0.617608
p∗h 8.48642 8.4861 8.487575 8.487409 8.475324 8.496719 8.397922 8.407862
p∗l 7.4262 7.42033 6.748059 6.742129 7.536979 7.410724 6.933531 6.790338
p∗h − p
∗
l 1.06022 1.06577 1.739516 1.74528 0.938345 1.085995 1.464391 1.617524
Table 5.5: Numerical Results for DS setting
A = 0.01 A = 0.25
PDS TDS PDS TDS
D S D S D S D S
L∗h 0.079836 0.079838 0.075915 0.075928 0.409076 0.375427 0.393641 0.381862
Ll − L∗h 0.920164 0.920162 0.924085 0.924072 0.590924 0.624573 0.606359 0.618138
p∗h 8.486179 8.486345 8.48746 8.487527 8.469203 8.502327 8.395587 8.410847
p∗l 7.425453 7.42108 6.747257 6.742933 7.520666 7.426818 6.914207 6.809853
ph − p∗l 1.060726 1.065265 1.740203 1.744595 0.948537 1.075509 1.481381 1.600994
small (see Appendix C.2). We illustrate this using numerical results obtained for
the parameter setting described in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 for two levels of capacity cost:
(i) A = 0.01 (for small capacity cost) and (ii) A = 0.25 (for large capacity cost).
A comparison of the equilibrium prices and delivery times in an SS versus a DD
setting is shown in Table 5.4, and for a DS setting is shown in Table 5.5.
5.4.2 Effect of Price and Delivery Time Competition
When firms use delivery time, in addition to price, as a strategic tool to attract
demand and compete in the market, this leads to another question of interest: how
does competition affect both price and delivery time differentiation? To answer
this, we compare the equilibrium prices and delivery time decisions in a competitive
setting with that under a monopolistic setting, discussed in chapter 2. Although
the effect may depend on the capacity strategy used by the firms, we restrict our
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study to the case where both firms use dedicated capacities since that leads to some
analytical results.
The effect of competition on price and delivery time differentiation, in gen-
eral, depends on the relative intensities of price competition (γp) and delivery time
competition (γL), as well as other demand parameters. The following proposition
summarizes the effect of competition for the following special cases: (i) γp = 0,
γL > 0 (ii) γp > 0, γL = 0.
Proposition 5.2. Price and delivery time competition in a dedicated capacity set-
ting:
- decreases both delivery time differentiation and price differentiation when γL = 0.
- increases both delivery time differentiation and price differentiation when γp = 0.
Proof. See Appendix C.3
The above proposition suggests that price and delivery time competition may
increase or decrease price and delivery time differentiation, depending on customers’
behavior. This is intuitive. When γL = 0, customers’ choice of a firm is not
influenced by the relative delivery times but by the relative prices offered by the
two firms. In such a situation, firms tend to cut prices to attract customers. At
the same time, they increase their express delivery time, and hence decrease their
delivery time differentiation, in order to cut their capacity cost and maintain their
profit. It further follows from (4.31) that a smaller delivery time differentiation in a
DD setting also results in a smaller price differentiation. On the other hand, when
γp = 0, customers’ choice of a firm is not influenced by the relative prices but by the
relative delivery times offered by the two firms. In such a situation, firms try to cut
their delivery times to attract customers. This results in a smaller express delivery
time, and hence a larger delivery time differentiation. Again, it follows from (4.31)
that a larger delivery time differentiation also allows the firms to maintain a larger
price differentiation.
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5.4.3 Effect of Asymmetry Between Firms
We have thus far studied firms that are symmetric with respect to their market base
a, capacity cost A and operating cost m, although they may use different capacity
strategies. For symmetric firms, we have studied the effects of firms’ capacity
strategies on their product differentiation strategies. However, competing firms,
in reality, may be asymmetric with respect to one or more of these parameters.
In such a scenario, a firm will try to exploit its competitive advantage of a lower
capacity cost A, or a higher market base a due to its better brand appeal. We
study the effects of such asymmetry on the equilibrium decisions of the competing
firms. We study such asymmetric competition in both DD as well as SS settings to
see if, and how, these effects vary with the capacity settings.
Asymmetry in Capacity Cost
Observation 5.4. If one of the firms, which are otherwise identical, has a higher
capacity cost, then compared to the other firm at equilibrium:
- in a DD setting, it has (a) a smaller delivery time differentiation, and (b) a
smaller price differentiation (Refer to Figure 5.2).
- in an SS seting, it has (a) a smaller delivery time differentiation, and (b) a
smaller price differentiation if the status-quo capacity cost is small, but a larger
price differentiation if the status-quo capacity cost is high (Refer to 5.3).
Figure 5.2 shows the equilibrium price and delivery time differentiations of the
two firms in a DD setting that differ in their capacity costs but are otherwise
identical. Figure 5.3 shows similar plots for an SS setting. We show these plots for
a PDS type market (parameter values shown in Table 5.2), although the qualitative
results are independent of the specific market parameters. Firm-specific parameters
are as shown in Table 5.3. In one set of experiments, we fix the capacity cost of
firm 1, A1, at 0.01 and vary that for firm 2, A2, from 0.01 to 0.10. In another
set of experiments, we fix A1 at 0.25 and vary A2 from 0.25 to 1.0. This helps
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(a) Delivery time differentiation versus marginal capacity cost 
when capacity cost is low 
(b) Price differentiation versus marginal capacity cost when 
capacity cost is low 































(c) Delivery time differentiation versus marginal capacity cost 
when capacity cost is high 
(d) Price differentiation versus marginal capacity cost when 
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Figure 5.2: Effects of capacity cost asymmetry on product differentiation decisions
in a DD setting
us capture the effect of a larger capacity cost incurred by firm 2 on the decisions
of the two firms at equilibrium. As evident from the plots, when the firms are
symmetric (A2 = A1), the delivery time and price differentiations of both firms
coincide. Any increase in firm 2′s capacity cost (A2) always decreases its delivery
time differentiation at equilibrium, irrespective of the capacity settings used by
the two firms. An increase in A2 also decreases firm 2′s price differentiation at
equilibrium in a DD setting. In an SS setting, an increase in A2 decreases firm
2′s price differentiation only for small capacity costs; for larger capacity costs, it
increases its price differentiation. Thus, our results for the monopolistic setting,
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(a) Delivery time differentiation versus marginal capacity cost 
when capacity cost is low 
(b) Price differentiation versus marginal capacity cost when 
capacity cost is low 

































(c) Delivery time differentiation versus marginal capacity cost 
when capacity cost is high 
(d) Price differentiation versus marginal capacity cost when 
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Figure 5.3: Effects of capacity cost asymmetry on product differentiation decisions
in an SS setting
described in chapter 3, also extend to a competitive setting. However, the effect
of an increase in firm 2′s capacity cost may have a similar or contrasting effect
on firm 1, depending on the market parameters and the level of the capacity cost.
Whatever be the effects on individual firms, when A2 > A1, firm 2 always has a
smaller delivery time differentiation, irrespective of the capacity settings. It also
has a smaller price differentiation in a DD setting, but a higher price differentiation
for larger capacity costs in an SS setting.
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Asymmetry in Market Base
Observation 5.5. If one of the firms, which are otherwise identical, has a larger
market base, then compared to the other firm at equilibrium:
- it always has (a) a larger delivery time differentiation, and (b) a larger price
differentiation, irrespective of the capacity strategy of either firm (Refer to Figures
5.4 and 5.5).


























































Figure 5.4: Effects of asymmetry in market base on product differentiation decisions
in a DD setting
We illustrate this result using a sample from our numerical experiments. We
consider two firms that have different market bases (a1 6= a2), but are otherwise
identical. Difference in the market bases of the two firms means that one firm
always has a higher mean demand even if they both offer the same delivery times
at the same prices. This may be the result of a difference in their brand appeal to
the customers or due to a more convenient locations or a better customer experience
at one of the firms. We assume the market is PDS type (parameter values shown
in Table 5.2), although the generalizations drawn are independent of the specific
market parameters. Firm specific parameters are as shown in Table 5.3. The
market base a1 for firm 1 is now fixed at 10, while that for firm 2 (a2) is varied.
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show the equilibrium price and delivery time differentiations
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    a1 = 10. A=0.25.  
Figure 5.5: Effects of asymmetry in market base on product differentiation decisions
in an SS setting
of the two firms in a DD and an SS setting, respectively. This helps us capture
the effect of a larger market base of firm 2 on the decisions of the two firms at
equilibrium. As evident from the plots, when the firms are symmetric (a2 = a1),
the delivery time and price differentiations of both firms coincide. Any increase in
firm 2′s market base (a2) increases its delivery time differentiation as well as the
price differentiation at equilibrium, irrespective of the capacity settings used by the
two firms. Although firm 1′s price and delivery time differentiation decisions also
increase with a2 in this case, this is specific only to this set of market parameters.
In general, the behavior of firm 1′s decisions depends on the market parameters.
Whatever be the effects on individual firms, when a2 > a1, firm 2 always has a
larger delivery time differentiation and a larger price differentiation, irrespective of
the capacity settings and market parameters.
5.5 Conclusions & Future Research
In this chapter, we extensively studied the different mathematical models developed
in chapter 4, which helped us generate important managerial insights. Our analyt-
ical/numerical study of the models clearly shows that the qualitative results of a
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monopolistic setting regarding the effect of firms’ operations strategy on their price
and delivery time differentiation decisions also hold true in a competitive environ-
ment. Specifically, when processing capacities are expensive, the firm with shared
capacities offers faster and more expensive product to time sensitive customers and
slower and cheaper product to price sensitive customers compared to the firm using
dedicated capacities. This implies that the firm with shared capacities offers prod-
ucts with greater differentiation. Further, the above effect of the capacity strategy
does not depend on any end customer characteristics or whether the products are
substitutable or not.
We also demonstrated that when firms are asymmetric with respect to their
capacity related costs or their market bases, each firm tries to use its distinctive
advantage to uniquely differentiate its products. The way a firm exploits its distinc-
tive advantage of lower capacity cost further depends on its own capacity strategy
and also of its competitor. Specifically, the firm with cheaper capacities makes its
products more differentiated if both firms use dedicated capacities. If both firms
use shared capacities, then the firm with cheaper capacities again makes its delivery
times more differentiated, but may offer more homogeneous or more differentiated
prices depending on the level of capacity cost. Whereas the firm with a larger
market base always offers more differentiated products, irrespective of the capacity
strategy of either firm.
Our study provides further insight into the effect of competition on price dis-
crimination. We showed that when firms use dedicated capacities, pure price com-
petition always reduces individual prices as well as price discrimination. However,
when firms use delivery times, in addition to prices, as strategic variables to com-
pete in the market, the effect of competition on product differentiation further
depends on customers’ behavior.
The above results are managerially quite relevant. First of all, they show how
managers should anticipate the outcome of competition, in terms of product dif-
ferentiation, given its own capacity strategy as well as the capacity strategy of
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its competitor. It also enables managers to anticipate how its competitor will use
its distinctive advantage to differentiate its products, and hence how to respond
optimally.
The competitive framework studied in chapters 4 and 5 can also be extended
along the same directions discussed in chapter 3. As discussed in chapter 3, one
possible extension would be to develop a good approximation for the sojourn time
distribution Sl(·) of the low priority customers in a shared capacity setting, which
will allow for a closed-form solution to the best response problem. This will also
allow for a proof of convergence and uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium when one
of the firms uses shared capacities. Further, the mathematical model for the best
response in a shared capacity setting can be extended to include delay dependent
dynamic priority discipline. Another possible extension may be to include the
guaranteed delivery time for regular customers also as a decision variable.
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Chapter 6
Summary & Future Research
6.1 Summary
In this dissertation, we focused on firms that exploit heterogeneity in customers’
preferences by offering a menu of products/services that differ only in their prices
and guaranteed delivery times. For such firms, we looked at two very different
operations strategies (sharing service/production capacities among different mar-
ket segments versus using dedicated facilities for each segment), and the way each
affects their marketing decision of differentiating their products for different cus-
tomer segments. We also looked at how a firm’s optimal product differentiation
is further affected by the degree of discrimination (second degree discrimination
versus third degree discrimination) it employs. From demand perspective, when
customers are allowed to self-select from the menu (second degree discrimination),
different products act as substitutes, affecting each other’s demand. Customized
product for each segment (third degree discrimination), on the other hand, results
in independent demand for each product. We tried to understand the interaction
between a firm’s operations strategy (dedicated versus shared capacities) and its
marketing strategy (second versus third degree discrimination), and how they shape
the optimal product differentiation decisions.
In chapters 2 and 3, we studied the above issues for a single profit maximizing
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monopolist firm, which offers two versions of the same basic product: (i) regular
product at a lower price but a longer delivery time, and (ii) express product with a
shorter delivery time but for a higher price. Demand was assumed to be uncertain,
modelled using a Poisson process. We modelled the price and time sensitivity
of customers using a mean of the Poisson demand as a deterministic function of
its price and delivery time, and used different price and time sensitivities for the
two customer segments. Further, we modelled product substitution by making the
mean demand for each product to also depend on the price and delivery time of
the other product. We modelled these dependencies of the mean demand using
linear functions for analytical tractability. However, we saw linear demand models
exhibit some important desirable properties, which are not exhibited by other more
complicated functions. We modelled the dedicated capacity strategy of a firm using
separate servers catering to each market segment. The shared capacity strategy, on
the other hand, was modelled using a single server, which serves both the market
segments, giving preemptive priority to customers for its express product. We
looked at how to optimally price the two products and select their guaranteed
delivery times so as to maximize the firm’s profit rate. For analytical tractability,
we assumed that the delivery time for the regular product is already established.
The firm simultaneously needs to decide its optimal processing capacity, represented
by its exponential processing rate, so as to meet its promised delivery times with a
predetermined minimum level of reliability.
Different combinations of operations strategy and marketing strategy of the
firm resulted in four possible scenarios: (i) Non-substitutable products; dedicated
capacity (ii) Non-substitutable products; shared capacity (iii) Substitutable prod-
ucts; dedicated capacity (iv) Substitutable products; shared capacity. Comparison
of the four scenarios allowed us to study the interactions between a firm’s opera-
tions and marketing strategies on optimal product differentiation. On the technical
side, the problem in a shared capacity setting became very challenging, especially
in the absence of an analytical characterization of sojourn time distribution of reg-
ular customers in a priority queue. We resolved this difficulty by developing a
132
solution algorithm, using matrix geometric method in a cutting plane framework,
to solve the problem numerically. Numerical solution of the problem in a shared
capacity setting prevented analytical comparisons of the different scenarios, and we
derived most of our insights from a numerical study, giving intuitive explanations
and mathematical justification wherever possible.
Our study showed that in a highly capacitated system, the firm should offer
products with greater differentiation if they use shared capacities compared to if
they use dedicated capacities, whether the products are substitutable or not. In
contrast, when customers are allowed to self-select, such that independent products
become substitutable, a more homogeneous pricing scheme results. However, the
effect of substitution on optimal delivery time differentiation depends on the firm’s
capacity strategy and cost, as well as market characteristics. The optimal response
to any change in capacity cost also depends on the firm’s operations strategy. In
a dedicated capacity scenario, the optimal response to an increase in capacity cost
is always to offer more homogeneous prices and delivery times. In a shared ca-
pacity setting, it is again optimal to quote more homogeneous delivery times, but
increase or decrease the price differentiation depending on whether the status-quo
capacity cost is high or low, respectively. We also demonstrated that the above re-
sults are corroborated by real-life practices, and provided a number of managerial
implications in terms of dealing with issues like volatile fuel prices.
In chapters 4 and 5, we extended our analysis to a competitive setting with
two firms, each of which may either share its processing capacities for the two
products, or may dedicate capacity for each product. The demand faced by each
firm for a given product now also depends on the price and delivery time quoted
for the same product by the other firm. We first studied the best response of each
firm, given the price and delivery time decisions of the other firm. We developed a
solution algorithm, which always converges to a unique solution, to determine the
decisions of the competing firms at equilibrium. We used the solution algorithm
to study the equilibrium decisions in three different scenarios (i) both firms use
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dedicated capacities (DD); (ii) both firms use shared capacities (SS); (iii) one firm
uses dedicated while the other uses shared capacities (DS). Comparing the solutions
of different scenarios, we derived generalizations on the effects of capacity strategy
on the product differentiation decisions of competing firms.
From our study, we observed that the qualitative results of a monopolistic setting
also extend to a competitive setting. Specifically, in a highly capacitated system,
the equilibrium prices and delivery times are such that they result in products with
greater differentiation when both the firms use shared capacities as compared to the
scenario when both the firms use dedicated capacities. When the competing firms
are asymmetric, they exploit their distinctive characteristics to differentiate their
products. Further, the effects of these asymmetries also depend on the capacity
strategy used by the competing firms. Our numerical results suggested that the firm
with expensive capacity always offers more homogeneous delivery times. However,
its decision on how to differentiate its prices depends on the capacity setting of
the two firms as well as the actual level of their capacity costs. On the other
hand, the firm with a larger market base always offers more differentiated prices as
well as delivery times, irrespective of the capacity setting of the competing firms.
Comparing the equilibrium solutions of our competitive setting with the optimal
solution of the monopolistic setting, we observed that competition may increase or
decrease product differentiation depending on the market structure.
The insights generated from our study are managerially quite relevant. First
of all, they show how capacitated firms should alter their product differentiation
strategy when they make changes in their market coverage of product offerings
and/or capacity strategy. We also showed that managers need to pay close at-
tention to two other factors - capacity cost of the business environment they are
operating in and the behavior of their end customers - both of which play crucial
role in many circumstances. Our analysis regarding the effects of any change in
capacity cost is especially relevant keeping in mind the volatility of fuel price, which
directly impacts capacity cost in a number of sectors. We demonstrated how man-
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agers should optimally respond to these changing business environments in order to
gain competitive advantage. Our insights from the competitive model demonstrate
how managers should anticipate the outcome of competition, in terms of product
differentiation, given its own capacity strategy as well as the capacity strategy of
its competitor. It also enables managers to anticipate how its competitor will use
its distinctive advantage to differentiate its products, and hence how to respond
optimally.
6.2 Directions for Future Research
The summary presented in the previous section shows our understanding of the ef-
fects of operations strategy and product substitution on the product differentiation
strategy of a firm in a service or make-to-order (MTO) industry. The models devel-
oped in this dissertation have potential for being extended and further evolved. We
have already discussed in chapters 3 and 5 the directions along which the current
models can be extended. The models developed in this dissertation can further
be extended for Make-to-Stock (MTS) and Assemble-to-Order (ATO) manufactur-
ing environment. A key feature distinguishing MTS and ATO from our models
for MTO is the issue of inventory management. Models for MTS/ATO will thus
require integrating inventory decisions in the modelling framework. While MTS
produces to stock end-products, ATO pools the inventories of different products by
producing components that can be quickly assembled into different end-products.
It will be worthwhile to study how inventory pooling in ATO affects the product
differentiation decision of a firm.
The models studied in this thesis include static decisions. We see pricing and
lead time setting for segmented markets in a dynamic setting as another possible
extension. Further, there is also a scope for empirical research to understand how
firms actually manage their capacities to serve different market segments, and also





















Absence of product substitution (θp = θL = 0) implies (A.1) = 0. This suggests
that sharing capacity, when it is relatively inexpensive, has no effect on the optimal
express delivery time, and hence on delivery time differentiation, in absence of
product substitution. Presence of product substitution (θp > 0, θL > 0), on the
other hand, implies (A.1) > 0. Further, π(Lh) is increasing concave in Lh for
Lh ≤ LDC∗h . Similarly, π(Lh) is increasing concave in Lh for Lh ≤ LSC∗h . This,
together with (A.1) > 0, implies that:
LSC∗h := {LSCh : ∂π/∂LSCh = 0} > LDC∗h := {LDCh : ∂π/∂LDCh = 0} for θL > 0
This implies that when A is small, sharing capacity in presence of product substitu-
tion increases optimal Lh, and hence decreases delivery time differentiation. This,
together with Proposition 2.3 and Observation 2.1, explains the effect of capacity
sharing on optimal ph.
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A high value of a (Assumption 2.2) makes (A.2) negative (resp., positive) if βhp θL−
βhLθp > 0 (resp., < 0). Also, the profit function is increasing concave in Lh. There-
fore, (A.2) < 0 (resp., > 0) implies that optimal L∗h decreases (resp., increases) with
substitution. This implies that product substitution decreases (resp., increases)
L∗h := {Lh : ∂π/∂Lh = 0}, and hence increases (resp., decreases) the delivery
time differentiation for a TDS (resp., PDS) type market. The effect of product
substitution in a shared capacity setting for small A can be similarly explained.
A.2 Explanations for Observation 3.6





































This implies that the optimal delivery time differentiation decreases with an increase
in the marginal capacity cost A.
The effect of an increase in A on price differentiation in DC follows from:
d(p∗h − p∗l )
dA
=
∂(p∗h − p∗l )
∂A
+


























B.1 Proof of Proposition 4.6
Proof. Given the strategy of firm j ∈ {1, 2}, the best response express delivery time




Taking the total derivative of the above relation with respect to the express delivery






































































































The numerator in RHS of (B.1) consists of terms that are functions only of the






















































This suggests that if the market parameters are such that (B.2) holds, firm i always
increases (decreases) its express delivery time Lih in response to a corresponding





Lih(n) be the best response decisions of firm i at the n
th iteration of the procedure.
If Lih(0) = 0, then L
i
h(n) ≥ Lih(0) for all n. We will show that if (B.2) holds, Lih(n)
is increasing in n for i ∈ {1, 2}. As Lih is bounded above (Lih < Ll), for i ∈ {1, 2},
this will establish that the iterative procedure converges. We prove the convergence
by induction as follows:
1. (Step n = 1): We know that Lih(1) ≥ Lih(0) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
2. (Step n− 1): Assume that Lih(n− 1) ≥ Lih(n− 2) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
3. (Step n): Given the inductive assumption from Step n−1, (B.2) implies that
Lih(n) ≥ Lih(n− 1) for i ∈ {1, 2}.
This completes our induction. In case (B.3) holds, convergence of the algorithm
can proved similarly by letting L1h(0) = Ll and L
2
h(0) = 0 and by showing that
L1h(n) is decreasing in n while L
2
h(n) is increasing in n.
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We show the uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium by contradiction. For any
given (L1h, L
2
h), the equilibrium prices are uniquely determined by the simultaneous
solution of the 4 linear equations given by (4.10) and (4.11) for i ∈ {1, 2}. Therefore,
an Equilibrium solution is completely specified by the pair of express delivery times
(L1h, L
2











h ). By numbering the firms and the two solutions appropriately, we













(B.3) holds. We will show that in either condition, such two equilibrium solutions
cannot both satisfy the optimality equation (4.13) = 0 for i ∈ {1, 2}.
For any given (L1h, L
2
h), the equilibrium prices, obtained by the simultaneous




























































l are functions of market and firm specific
parameters, and hence are constants for a given problem setting. Substituting the
equilibrium prices in the optimality equation (4.13) for i ∈ {1, 2}, we get:
f 1(L1h, L
2




h − A1 ln(1− α)/(L1h)2 = 0 (B.4)
f 2(L1h, L
2




















= 0. It should also hold that f 1∆ = f 1(L1h, L
2












h ) = 0, and therefore, f
∆ = f 1∆ + f 2∆ = 0. However, given
(B.2) holds and ∂2πi/∂(Lih)
2 < 0, ∂2πi/∂(Li
′
h)





h. Similarly, given (B.3) holds and ∂
2πi/∂(Lih)








h. Thus, we conclude that there is a unique
equilibrium solution in a DD setting.
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B.2 Explanation for Observation 4.4
When both the firms use shared capacities and both have small express delivery
times, the equilibrium prices can be obtained from the simultaneous solution of the
4 linear equations given by (4.25) and (4.26) for i ∈ {1, 2}. The system of equations











and A is the same matrix as that for the DD setting, given by (4.30). The only
difference between the system of equations between a DD and an SS setting is in
the 4x1 matrix of constants, b. We have already shown (see proof of Proposition
4.5) that A is a full-rank matrix, and hence the system of linear equations Ax = b
has a unique solution. Proof for symmetry of the equilibrium solution is the same
as for the DD setting. Hence, s1∗(Lh) = s
2∗(Lh). Substituting p
1∗





l (Lh) = p
2∗
l (Lh) = p
∗
l (Lh) in the expressions for the best response
prices, given by (4.25) and (4.26), and solving the resulting system of 2 equations





C.1 Proof of Proposition 5.1
Comparing the monopolist prices, given by Proposition 2.3 with the equilibrium










Kh1 a + K
h
2 Lh + K
h
3 Ll + K
h










p γp + 2β
l





























p γp + 2β
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4 are some functions
































pγp + 2θpγp > 0
K l1 = 2(β
h
p )






p γp + 2θpγp > 0
Kd1 = (β
l
p − βhp )γp + 2{(βlp)2 − (βhp )2}+ 4(βlp − βhp )θp > 0
Therefore, Kh1 > 0, K
l
1 > 0 and K
d
1 > 0 ⇒ (C.1) < 0, (C.2) < 0 and (C.3) < 0,
respectively if γp > 0. This shows that pure price competition decreases both the
express and regular prices as well as the price differentiation.
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Further, for Lh ≤ LDC∗h in DC, profit function is increasing concave in Lh. Also, for
Lh ≤ LSC∗h in SC, profit function is increasing concave in Lh. This, together with
(C.4), shows that LSC∗h := {LSCh : ∂π/∂LSCh = 0} ≥ LDC∗h := {LDCh : ∂π/∂LDCh =
0}. Thus, SS setting results in a larger L∗h and hence a smaller delivery time
differentiation if the products are substitutable (i.e., θp > 0 and θL > 0).
Further, comparison of equilibrium prices (comparison of (4.28) with (4.32) and
(4.29) with (4.33)) suggests that both express and regular prices are smaller under
SS setting compared to DD setting for a given Lh. Whereas, comparison of (4.31)
with (4.34) shows that the price differentiation increases in an SS setting for a given
Lh. A larger Lh in SS setting compared to DD setting partly offsets the difference
in the price differentiation in the two settings, but all our numerical results suggest
that the price differentiation is still higher in SS setting.
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C.3 Proof of Proposition 5.2
The effect of competition on the express delivery time when firms use dedicated
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where, K1, K2, K3 and K4 are some functions only of the system parameters, and
hence are constants. For large a, (Assumptions 2.2 and 4.2), (C.5) is dictated




































































Clearly, the effect of competition on Lh, and hence on delivery time differentiation,
depends on the relative intensities of price competition (γp) and delivery time com-
petition (γL), as well as other demand parameters. γp = 0 and γL > 0 results in
C.6 > 0, and hence C.5 < 0. Thus, Lh is smaller under competition when γp = 0.
Further, (C.1), (C.2) and (C.3) suggest that for a given Lh, the equilibrium prices
as well as the price differentiation under DD coincide with the monopolist prices
and price differentiation under DC for γp = 0. However, a smaller Lh under DD
compared to DC results in a larger price differentiation.
γp > 0 and γL = 0, on the other hand, results in C.6 < 0, and hence C.5
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